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Chapter 1
Late-career Unemployment Shocks,
Pension Outcomes and Unemployment
Insurance
1.1

Introduction

What is the effect of late-career unemployment shocks on retirement income? Late
career layoffs leave workers vulnerable to a lower likelihood of re-employment [Chan
and Huff Stevens 2001; Hirsch, Macpherson, and Hardy 2000], longer unemployment
durations [GAO 2012], a post-displacement wage penalty [Shapiro and Sandell 1985],
age discrimination [Neumark, Burn, and Button 2019] and deteriorated health [Coile,
Levine, and McKnight 2014]. Their reduced job opportunities and short remaining career time make it less likely for older workers to replenish their retirement savings after
an unemployment-induced depletion. Unemployment shocks could also motivate early
Social Security (SS) claiming leaving individuals with a lower stream of benefits throughout retirement. What role can Unemployment Insurance (UI) play to alleviate these con-

1

straints? Addressing these questions help explain the factors driving retirement income
security of nearly a million unemployed workers aged 55-64 in the United States.1
I show that following a job loss, older workers initiate a fast depletion of their definedcontribution (DC) 401(k) wealth, followed by a similar depletion of their Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), well before the Full Retirement Age (FRA)2 . This early depletion of private pensions makes Social Security (SS) wealth their main remaining asset
dedicated to retirement. These pension decumulation decisions by the unemployed are
further intensified by the removal of the Early Withdrawal Penalty (EWP) on 401(k)s,
at age 55 for job losers, and on IRAs, at age 59 21 for all individuals. Hence, these asset
decumulation decisions are highly responsive to the tax-price of withdrawals from TaxDeferred pension Accounts (TDAs).
This paper shows that Unemployment Insurance (UI) keeps older workers from depleting their 401(k) pension assets following job losses. UI has a similar effect on older
unemployed workers’ SS take-up timing decisions. Following a job loss, SS-eligible individuals with access to more generous UI are more likely to delay SS benefits claiming beyond the earliest age of eligibility, 62. UI significantly enhances retirement income for the
workers with a history of late-career layoffs in two ways. First, reducing unemploymentmotivated 401(k) asset leakage helps older workers preserve the returns on their retirement investments. Second, incentivizing older job losers to delay SS claiming results in
a higher expected present value of their stream of benefits. Overall, UI, a policy mainly
aiming at easing short-term liquidity constraints, helps older workers improve their longterm private pensions and social security outcomes throughout retirement.
Using two panels of data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP),
covering the periods 1996-1999 and 2001-2003, I link workers’ labor market histories to
their 401(k) pension outcomes and their SS benefit receipt histories. I exploit a tax code
1. Data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics at https://www.bls.gov/web/empsit/cpseea36.htm and
GAO (2012).
2. The FRA, the age of workers’ eligibility for the Social Security Primary Insurance Amount, is 65 for
the time frame studied in this paper.

2

exception that waives the EWP on withdrawals from 401(k) plans following a job separation during or after the year the employee reaches age 55. This exception creates a
discontinuity in the tax price of unemployment-induced withdrawals around that age. I
document significant asset flows out of 401(k) plans in response to job losses occurring
after age 55. A job loss just after age 55 resulted in a 51 percent larger decline in 401(k)
pension savings, compared to a job loss just before 55, equivalent to the withdrawal of
$5,900 of 401(k) assets upon job loss. The absence of contemporaneous inflows into IRAs
suggests that these funds leaked out of the tax-deferred system to cover unemploymentrelated or non-tax-deferred expenses. The parallel trends of 401(k) savings between job
losers and employed workers younger than 55 support a causal interpretation of this finding. Similarly, in response to the complete removal of the EWP on IRA withdrawals at
age 59 12 , I report large layoff-induced depletion of IRA wealth of the unemployed immediately after that age. By the age of eligibility for early SS benefits, 62, workers with
a history of late-career layoffs had already significantly depleted their private pensions,
making social security their main source of income dedicated to retirement.
I then estimate the effect of UI generosity on DC pension decumulation of older job
losers by comparing the trends of 401(k) savings among the unemployed and the employed, in response to state-level changes in UI benefits generosity, holding other statetime factors constant. I show that a $1,000 increase in states’ regular maximum unemployment benefits, during the course of an unemployment spell, reduces the negative
effect of a job loss on 401(k) savings by enabling older unemployed workers to preserve
an average of about $750 of 401(k) savings from depletion during unemployment. These
effects are stronger among the most liquidity constrained workers, namely those with few
financial assets outside of retirement accounts.
I conduct a similar analysis of UI benefit generosity on social security claiming behavior following a job loss. I compare the likelihood of SS benefits claiming between older
workers subjected to job loss shocks at different ages and residing in states with different
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levels of UI benefits generosity. Late-career job loss shocks lead to immediate SS claiming
once individuals become SS-eligible, at age 62, consistent with Coile and Levine (2007,
2011) and Card, Maestas, and Purcell (2014). Yet, I show that among the SS-eligible job
losers, those with access to more generous UI are more likely to delay SS benefits claiming
beyond the earliest age of eligibility.
These findings make three main contributions to the literature and to the formulation of public policies targeting older workers. First, while many studies document the
consumption smoothing effects of UI [Browning and Crossley 2009; East and Kuka 2015;
Gruber 1997], this paper is the first to show that UI enhances retirement income for the
individuals with a history of late-career layoffs by helping them preserve their 401(k)
savings from depletion during unemployment spells and by incentivizing them to delay
their social security take-up decision beyond age 62. These two long-term effects of UI on
retirement income security add to the set of factors considered in the design of optimal
UI policy.
Second, I exploit a sharp discontinuity in the tax price of accessing 401(k) accounts by
job losers around age 55 based on the timing of the job loss to estimate the responsiveness
of pension flows to the removal of the EWP. This elasticity estimate contributes to the
current debate on the optimal liquidity of pension accounts [Beshears et al. 2015] and is
crucially needed to infer workers’ responses to the usage of the EWP as a policy lever to
alleviate financial hardships during downturns. For instance, the 2020 Coronavirus Aid,
Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES) waived the EWP on coronavirus-related pension distributions, including distributions made to alleviate financial hardships resulting
from corona-related layoffs or reduced hours of work. While this measure can reduce the
cost of funds for the unemployed, the removal of the EWP may trigger an early depletion
of pension savings with significant consequences on future retirement income. Estimates
provided by this paper help quantify the effects of the removal of the penalty on job lossmotivated pension withdrawals and consequently, on retirement income. They also serve
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as guidance for policymakers considering the suspension of the EWP as a policy lever in
response to future downturns.
Third, there is limited evidence to date on the effect of labor market shocks on defined
contribution pensions, particularly due to the lack of longitudinal data linking workers’
labor market histories to the evolution of their pension wealth [Mitchell and Turner 2010].
This data deficiency limited prior research on pre-retirement pension withdrawals to tax
returns data with little information on contemporaneous labor market outcomes [Amromin and Smith 2003; Argento, Bryant, and Sabelhaus 2015; Chang 1996]. I overcome
this challenge using the Survey of Income and Program Participation that allows me to
construct detailed labor market histories of workers throughout the panel and link them
to their 401(k)s, IRAs as well as their SS benefit receipt over time.

1.2
1.2.1

Policy background
Tax-deferred pension accounts: 401(k) and IRA plans

To reduce workers’ incentives for pre-retirement withdrawals from 401(k) plans, the
1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA) imposed a 10% penalty in addition to applicable income taxes,
on 401(k) distributions made prior to the 59 12 age threshold. A similar early withdrawal
penalty applies to IRAs. However, a number of hardship-related exceptions provide
workers with penalty-free access to their 401(k)s to allow for some flexibility to use pension savings in response to transitory shocks prior to that age. This includes withdrawals
made following a job separation during or after the year the employee reaches age 55.3
This exception does not apply for IRAs.
Following job separations, workers have two options to manage the savings they accumulated in their former employers’ defined contribution plans. First, they can preserve
3. Internal Revenue Code Section 72(t)(2)(A)(v). Other exceptions include, but are not limited to, distributions made because of total and permanent disability or substantial un-reimbursed medical expenses.
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the tax-deferred status of their savings. They can do this by keeping their funds with
their old employers’ plans or transfer them to their new plans with their new firms. Alternatively, they can transfer them into an IRA (an IRA rollover). Second, employees can
also cashout their pension savings to finance their consumption during an unemployment spell or to make non-tax-deferred investments. The second option is considered
to be a leakage of funds outside of the pension system, corresponding to the usage of
tax-deferred pension savings for non-retirement purposes. These early distributions are
penalized by a 10% EWP unless they qualify for a tax code exception, such as a job separation after age 55.
The U.S. defined contribution system provides significant flexibility to respond to
transitory income shocks, by allowing relatively less costly pre-retirement withdrawals
compared to other developed countries [Beshears et al. 2015]. This flexibility allows
significant pre-retirement leakage of retirement savings out of the tax-deferred system.
These early withdrawals are common and usually associated with income shocks [Argento, Bryant, and Sabelhaus 2015] and are typically prevalent among liquidity constrained workers who are less likely to rollover their funds into tax-qualified accounts
following a job separation [Chang 1996]. The size of this leakage is a policy concern, with
Argento, Bryant, and Sabelhaus (2015) estimating a leakage of 40 cents for each dollar of
pension contributions made prior to age 55. An argument for this flexibility is that the
option to withdraw funds prior to retirement, could be an incentive for additional contributions [Poterba and Venti 2001]. In contrast, Beshears et al. (2020) argue that early
withdrawal penalties do not reduce workers’ willingness to commit to savings vehicles.
A rollover of 401(k) savings into an IRA preserves the tax-deferred status of pension
assets. Additionally, IRAs allow workers to delay paying taxes on their contributions.
Contributions cannot exceed an annually defined contribution limit or yearly the taxable
compensation of the individual, where compensation is generally defined by the IRS as
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earned income.4 However, contribution limits do not apply to rollovers of pension savings. To limit the extent of possible tax-deferral, IRA holders are required to start making
Required Minimum Distributions (RMDs) at the age threshold 70 12 .5

1.2.2

Social security

Social Security retirement benefits can be claimed at any age starting age 62, but actuarial adjustments are made based on the age of benefits initiation. Claiming at the full
retirement age, 65 for the time frame of this study, guarantees a 100% of one’s Primary
Insurance Amount (PIA) determined based on the worker’s lifetime earnings. Claiming
prior to the FRA reduces the benefits amount by

5
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% of the PIA for each month of differ-

ence between the FRA and the age of SS benefits initiation. Accordingly, for the sample
studied in the paper the penalty for claiming at 62 is %20 of the PIA.6 Similarly, delaying
benefits claiming by one month, from 62 to 62 and a month, is equivalent to purchasing
a one month deferred annuity providing a lifelong benefit of

5
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% of the PIA in exchange

for a one time premium of 80% of the PIA. A large body of literature emphasizes the actuarial advantages of delaying the benefits initiation decision [Coile et al. 2002; Shoven and
Slavov 2014; Munnell and Soto 2005]. However, 62 is the most popular age for benefits
initiation with about 40% of all workers claiming at 62 [Munnell and Chen 2015].

1.3

Conceptual framework

Older workers face a trade-off between unemployment risk and longevity risk; the
risk of running out of funds at old ages. Pre-retirement pension withdrawals reduce
4. Accordingly, unemployment and social security benefits are generally not considered earned income
for IRA contribution purposes.
5. RMD rules also apply to employer-sponsored plans such as 401(k)s. Similar to the EWP, RMDs have
been recently suspended by the CARES act.
6. The 1983 reform increased the penalty of early claiming by increasing the full retirement age. However, cohorts impacted by this reform reached their new full retirement age starting 2004 which is beyond
the time frame of this study.
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the financial resources available for retirement funding. Following a late-career job loss,
workers have three potential options to tap: their defined-contribution 401(k) plans, their
IRAs or their SS Wealth. To make these decisions, older unemployed workers choose the
amount of their pre-retirement pension distribution Dt that maximizes the discounted
sum of their utilities prior and after retirement:

During U nemployment

P ost Retirement

z
}|
{
z
}|
{
V (Dt ) = max u(It + Dt (1 − EW P (Aget )) + U It ) + β u(It+1 + (P − Dt )(1 + rt ))
Dt

(1.1)

The utility of consumption in the pre-retirement period is a function of income It , in
addition to a pre-retirement pension distribution Dt subject to an age-dependent early
withdrawal penalty EWP, as well as unemployment benefits U It . After retirement, the
early distribution translates to a loss of investment returns on the amount of the distribution rt Dt where rt is the rate of return on pension assets. The remaining pension income
available to the worker is given by (P − Dt )(1 + rt ). It+1 denotes other sources of postretirement income such as SS.
A job loss interrupts workers’ incomes (reduces It ) and increases the marginal value of
pre-retirement pension distributions. Among the unemployed, the removal of the EWP
reduces the tax price of a distribution and thus increases its utility value. The tax price
of accessing each of these pensions is age-dependent and is key in determining the order
at which older workers make use of these funds in response to layoffs.7 Three tax price
discontinuities influence the drawdown of retirement wealth following a late-career job
loss. First, age 55 defines a discontinuity in the tax price of 401(k) funds. A job loss after
55 allows penalty-free access to 401(k)s. Second, age 59 21 defines a discontinuity in the
tax price of IRAs. After 59 12 , tapping IRAs becomes relatively cheaper than before 59 12 .
Third, reaching age 62 triggers eligibility for early, but actuarially reduced, SS benefits.
7. For Social Security, the loss at the post retirement period would be the actuarial adjustment resulting
from early claiming, leading to a lower stream of SS income.
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Accordingly, SS wealth could be seen as a pension account with an infinity tax price of
accessing prior to age 62. At age 62, the tax price of claiming becomes equal to the actuarial reduction of the benefits amount relative to claiming at the FRA, 65. Therefore, the
timing of the unemployment shock implies the relative tax prices of tapping each of the
three available pension accounts.

401(k) Tax Price

Price SS=
Price 401(k)=Price IRA=EWP

Price 401(k)<Price IRA

55

8

SS Eligibility

Discontinuity

Price SS= Actuarial Loss

59.5

62

FRA

Price 401(k)=Price IRA=0

Timing

of a job loss
IRA Tax Price
Discontinuity

Age-dependent tax prices of tapping available pension accounts: This diagram illustrates the
relative tax prices of tapping of different pension accounts. Prior to age 55, withdrawals from both
401(k)s and IRAs are subjected to a 10% EWP. Within the age range 55-59 12 , unemploymentmotivated access to 401(k)s is penalty-free but IRAs are still subject to the EWP. After 59 12 , the
EWP on IRAs is removed. Reaching age 62 unlocks SS wealth. However, claiming prior to the
FRA entails an actuarial loss.

Being a cheaper substitute, UI unambiguously reduces the marginal value of preretirement pension distributions. By enabling older unemployed workers to preserve
their pension savings from depletion following a job loss, unemployment benefits boosts
9

lifetime and retirement income. The gains in retirement income are the investment returns on the assets that preserved from depletion due to unemployment benefits. The
analyses conducted in this paper provides an empirical estimate of the effect of UI on
pre-retirement pension withdrawals. Knowing the prevailing average market returns,
this estimate can be used to infer the loss of retirement income due to early distributions.
A similar rationale applies to social security delays. Unemployment benefits lower the
marginal value of early social security benefits. Accordingly, it can keep older unemployed workers from early social security benefit initiation. The return on this delay is
lifetime higher amount of benefits realized by claiming later.

1.4
1.4.1

Data
401(k) and IRA asset data

I use data on individual asset holdings in 401(k)’s and IRAs from two consecutive
panels from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (the 1996 and 2001 panels),
covering the periods 1996-1999 and 2001-2003 respectively. Asset data are collected annually and made available by topical modules accompanying waves 3, 6, 9 and 12 (where
available).8 This data replicate the main features of the age profile and distribution of
TDAs’ balances known in the literature. Specifically, the effects of age-specific tax rules
reflect clearly on the age profile of 401(k) and IRA asset holdings. First, 401(k)’s population average balances start declining significantly exactly after the 59 12 age cutoff [Figure
1.1 (A)], corresponding to the removal of the EWP. Figure 1.1 (B) shows a sharp step decline in 401(k) balances’ average growth rate immediately at this age cutoff, consistent
with the removal of the EWP triggering significant withdrawals immediately after the
age 59 21 . Second, a similar decline in IRA asset holdings is observed after the age of 70,
8. The 1996 Panel provides Asset Data in four topical modules covering individual asset holdings approximately at the end of 1996, 97, 98 and 99. The 2001 panel provides three asset modules at the end of
2001, 2002 and 2003.
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consistent with Required Minimum Distributions (RMD) rules triggering withdrawals at
the age of 70 21 [Brown, Poterba, and Richardson 2017; Love and Smith 2007; Mortenson,
Schramm, and Whitten 2019]. Third, being employer-sponsored, 401(k) balances are in
line with the age profile of earnings while IRAs remain used throughout retirement transitions.
[Figures 1.1 (A) and 1.1 (B) about here]
Fourth, Appendix Table A.1 shows that the TDAs’ asset distribution is highly unequal,
consistent with the literature on inequality and the distribution of wealth [Benhabib and
Bisin 2018] and the distribution of TDA wealth in particular [Gelber 2011]. The sample
at hand contains a total of 287,623 individual-year observations corresponding to 104,031
working-age individuals (22-65 years old). Only 28.2% of these individuals report owning
401(k) accounts, consistent with the low participation rates in employer-sponsored plans
documented by Butrica and Smith (2012).9 Similarly, 19.4% report ownership of an IRA.
Consistently, the median values for asset holdings in 401(k)s and IRAs are zeros while the
average market values are $7828.2 and $4890.5 ($2000 dollars) for 401(k) and IRA accounts
respectively. TDAs asset holdings grow steadily as workers age. However, inequality in
retirement savings persists. For the near-retirement population aged 50-59, the median
values of 401(k) and IRA accounts are also zeros while the averages are $13,393.8 and
$9,526.8 ($2000 dollars) respectively.
[Table 2.8 about here]

1.4.2

Labor market history and demographic characteristics

SIPP allows researchers to link asset data (including assets held in retirement accounts)
provided by its topical modules with individuals’ detailed labor market histories provided by the core modules of SIPP. Core modules collect information on individuals’
9. Participation rate in employer-sponsored dc plans increased over time reaching about 41% in 2010
[Butrica and Smith (2012)].
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weekly labor force status. Each consecutive set of three cores waves of SIPP 1-3, 4-6,
7-9 and 10-12 (where available) cover approximately a calendar year. I compute the total
duration (weeks of unemployment) of all unemployment spells experienced by each individual within each of these sets, corresponding approximately to each calendar year. Asset data are collected also approximately at the end of the calendar year. Accordingly, the
joint employment-asset dataset I construct includes labor market information throughout
the year linked with asset data collected at the end of the year.10
To measure the periods of unemployment, I consider the weeks at which workers
report being on layoff or absent without pay or without a job and looking for work.11
For each worker in each year, I compute the number of weeks of unemployment. I then
define two indicator variables: 1) being on layoff, Layof fit , that equals one if worker i had
some weeks of unemployment during year t and zero otherwise, and 2) similar to Chetty
(2008), I define the timing of a job loss, Job Lossit , to be the timing of the transition from
an employment to an unemployment state. Accordingly, Job Lossit equals one if worker
i experienced some weeks of unemployment, due to a layoff, at year t, no weeks of layoff
at year t-1 and was not out of the labor force.12 Accordingly, Job Lossit indicates the exact
timing (Age-Year) of a job loss. For the population aged 50-59 years old, I identify 1,476
events of job loss for a population size of 22,975 individuals. Workers are observed for
four consecutive years in SIPP panel 1996 or for three consecutive years in SIPP panel
2001.
Demographic characteristics of the near-retirement sample approximately match documented U.S. population averages for similar age categories as reported by the 2000 Census. This includes the distributions of educational attainment, race, martial status, and
10. See Appendix for a detailed description of the construction of the dataset.
11. I use the SIPP variables RWKESR1, RWKESR2, RWKESR3, RWKESR4 and RWKESR5 that report
worker’s labor force status for each week within each month of the panel. I consider a week to be a week
of layoff if the worker responded by either With job/bus - on layoff, absent w/out pay or No job/bus - looking for
work or on layoff.
12. I consider an individual to be not in the labor force if he /she reports being unemployed but not
looking for a job during all weeks of the year.
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gender. About 15.8% of the sample have less than a high school diploma, 31.9% are high
school graduates, and 25.9% have a bachelor’s degree or higher, which approximately
replicates the same distribution of educational attainment for a similar age category in
2000.13 About 68.5% of the sample are married, and about the 52.5% of sample are women
corresponding approximately to the sex ratio among that age category at year 2000.14
[Table 1.2 about here]

1.4.3

Social security benefits receipt

SIPP does not provide information on workers’ SS claiming age. I identify the timing of SS benefits initiation as the transition from zero to some positive SS income at the
annual level. To make sure this approach matches the claiming behavior documented
in the literature, I further use the sequence of reported monthly SS income and define
a SS claiming event as a sequence of zero monthly SS income followed by some positive monthly SS income. I then truncate the exact age of claiming to the smallest integer
value. While this approach might overlook the individuals who, at the onset of the panel,
were already SS recipients, I am able to replicate, in Appendix Figure A.1, approximately
the same pattern of SS claiming documented using administrative datasets [Munnell and
Chen 2015]. I identify 3,133 events of SS benefits claiming for individuals in the 62-70
age range, with a spike in claiming by workers between their 62nd and 63rd birthdays
(39.67%), a smaller spike at the FRA (16.34%), 65 for these cohorts and very few individuals waiting beyond the FRA.15 Consistent with Munnell and Chen (2015), women are less
likely to delay claiming till the FRA.
13. Almost similar population averages educational attainment could be obtained using the Census
Statistics for similar age categories in 2000. https://www.census.gov/topics/education/educationalattainment/data/tables.2000.html
14. I compare all educational and demographic characteristics of the sample with the relevant statistics
provided by the U.S. 2000’s census to ensure that the sample at hand approximately matches the same
average characteristics for similar age categories in the United States in 2000.
15. I exclude events of claiming whenever disability is reported as a reason for claiming.
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1.4.4

State Unemployment Benefit Generosity

Unemployment insurance is a joint federal-state program that provides cash benefits
to unemployed workers who lost their jobs through no fault of their own provided that
they are able and available to work and are actively seeking re-employment during the
benefits’ duration. The heterogeneity in state UI benefit generosity stems from the fact
that states independently set their own UI benefit formulae.16 Similar to Agrawal and
Matsa (2013) and Hsu, Matsa, and Melzer (2018), I measure regular state UI benefit generosity using the legal parameters defining the maximum generosity of state UI laws;
specifically the upper bound of weekly benefits and the maximum duration of eligibility
in weeks.17 I use the product of these two parameters, M ax Benef itst , as a measure of the
maximum amount of benefits made available by states’ UI regular benefits programs in
each year over the period of the SIPP panels used 1996-1999 and 2001-2003. This product
reflects the maximum amount of UI benefits a claimant could receive during the course
of an unemployment spell. There is limited variation between states and over time in
the duration of benefit eligibility (26 weeks on average). However, there is a wide range
of variation in the maximum weekly level of income support states make available to
the unemployed varying from a minimum of $175 weekly benefits in Missouri in 1996
and 1997, to a maximum of $768 in Massachusetts in 2002. Table 1.3 provides summary
statistics on M ax Benef itst for the 46 states covered by the analyses in this paper.18 UI
is expressed in $1,000 corresponding to 0.38 standard deviation in the maximum amount
of benefits available during the course of an unemployment spell in the 46 states and the
period of study 1996-1999 and 2001-2003. A variation of $1,000 in benefits is also slightly
16. Additionally, exceptional federal programs might kick in to provide supplemental funding to states
during economic downturns. These exceptional programs include the Extended Benefits Program and the
Emergency Unemployment Compensation Program. However, the analyses carried out in this paper all
focus on the states’ regular UI programs.
17. These UI generosity parameters are collected from the U.S. Department of Labor webpage on the
’Significant Provisions of State UI Laws’ and are made available by Hsu, Matsa, and Melzer (2018).
18. To ensure respondents’ confidentiality, SIPP data provides state location information only for respondents residing in 45 states and the District of Columbia. Omitted states are Maine, Vermont, North Dakota,
South Dakota and Wyoming.
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less than half the average state-level change in unemployment benefits over the period of
the study.
[Table 1.3 about here]
The generosity of these benefits also changed considerably over time, with an average
increase of 31% or $2210 in 2003 relative to 1996. Figure 1.2 shows the geographic distribution of these state UI changes by quartiles. I do not detect a clear geographic pattern
of these percentage changes. For instance, states with highest increases in their benefits
include Northeastern states such as Massachusetts with a 46% increase, Southern states
such as Georgia with a 44% increase, Midwestern states such as Missouri with a 43%
increase, and Western states with a 61% increase.
[Figure 1.2 about here]

1.5
1.5.1

Late-career job loss and pension asset decumulation
Late-career job loss and 401(k) pension decumulation

I start with an empirical estimation of the effect of a job loss, around age 55, on 401(k)
savings. The cost of accessing 401(k) funds following a layoff depends on the age at which
workers separate from service. By waiving the EWP at age 55, the tax code exception creates a sharp discontinuity in the tax price of accessing these funds for laid-off workers,
whereas the EWP remains effective for non-job losers.19 Accordingly, unemployed workers’ incentives to tap their 401(k)s vary sharply depending on the age at which they lost
their jobs, pre vs. post age 55. I graphically illustrate the effect of this discontinuity on
the pattern of 401(k) asset accumulation of job losers. I use the job loss timing measure
Job Lossit to plot, in Figure 1.3, the age profile of average 401(k) asset growth rates for two
19. The EWP is then completely removed for all groups at age 59 12 .
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groups: workers who separated from service due to a layoff and all other individuals. I
average workers’ asset growth rates for each of these two categories by age, net of person
fixed-effects (subtracting the average growth rate for each worker). I provide an overview
of the sample sizes, by age and employment status, involved in graphing this figure in
Table 1.4. For the near-retirement population, age 50-59, I identify 1,476 layoff events.
Among these, 323 layoff events correspond to individuals owning 401(k) accounts. The
401(k) ownership rate among the whole population age 50-59 is 30.5%. Job separation
rates for this near-retirement sample of individuals reflect the U.S. population average
unemployment for approximately the same age categories during the period 1996-2003.20
[Table 1.4 about here]
The treatment group line (blue line in Figure 1.3) depicts job losers’ average growth
rates of assets held in 401(k) accounts by age of job loss. The control group (red line on the
same figure) plots the average 401(k) asset growth rates of non-job losers. While accessing
401(k) becomes less costly for those who got laid-off after age 55 compared to those who
lost their jobs prior to age 55, the tax price is constant for non-job losers. Consistently,
Figure 1.3 shows a divergence of savings’ trends between the two groups starting exactly
at age 55. Specifically, it documents a precipitous decumulation of 401(k) assets for individuals who experienced a layoff after age 55 compared to those who experienced one
prior to that age, relative to the individuals who did not experience a layoff. For workers
younger than 55, the two trend lines, net off fixed-effects, are almost identical. This postage 55 decumulation of 401(k) assets and the identical pre-age 55 trends suggest a causal
effect of the change in the tax price of accessing 401(k)s by job losers.
[Figure 1.3 about here]
20. The quarterly unemployment rate for the population aged 55-64 years old during 1996-2003 is around
3-3.5% as provided by the BLS at https://data.bls.gov/PDQWeb/ln. and approximately similar to the rates
implied by the separations documented in Table 1.4.
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To provide an average estimate of the effect a job loss after age 55 compared to before
55, I estimate the following specification for the population aged 50-59 years old:
Yit = α + ηi + β1 Job Lossit + β2 1[Ageit > 55] + β3 1[Ageit > 55] × Job Lossit + ζst + Xit Γ + it
(1.2)
The dependent variable Yit = ln(Ait + 10) − ln(Ait−1 + 10) is the annual growth rate of
401(k) assets Ait of worker i of age Ageit at year t, holding the average asset growth rate
(ln(Ait + 10) − ln(Ait−1 + 10)) for each worker constant, by accounting for person fixedeffects ηi .21 Job Lossit is equal to one if worker i got laid-off at year t and zero otherwise.

1[Ageit > 55] is an indicator function that equals one if the worker is older than 55 at
the end of calendar year t and zero otherwise. ζst holds state-wide policies and shocks
constant; Xit is a vector of person-specific time-varying controls accounting for lagged
versions of earnings, financial assets and liabilities owed independently and jointly with
spouse;22 α is an intercept term and it is an idiosyncratic error term. Accordingly, β1
quantifies the average association between job loss and the growth rate of 401(k) savings
and β2 captures the average difference between workers older and younger than 55. The
coefficient of interest β3 quantifies the average effect of a layoff after age 55 compared
to a layoff before 55 on the growth rate of 401(k) pension savings. Consistent with the
effect illustrated in Figure 1.3, Table 1.5 [Column (1)] displays the estimates for β3 . A job
loss just after the age 55 results in a 51 percent larger decline in 401(k) pension savings
compared to a job loss just before 55, corresponding to a job loss motivated withdrawal
of approximately $5,900 (in 2000’s dollars) of pension assets.
[Table 1.5 about here]
21. Similar to Gelber (2011), 401(k) assets are incremented by $10 so that the natural logarithm is defined
for all asset observations including workers having zero assets.
22. Xit includes annual earnings, checking and saving accounts’ balances, bonds and stock holdings,
credit card debt and store bills owed (independently and jointly with spouse) and mortgage or rent payments. These control variables account for households’ balance sheets and reflect the flexibility they have
in weathering unemployment shocks.
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To test for functional form dependence, I use an alternative transformation for the dependent variable, 401(k) assets. Similar to Gelber (2011), I use the Inverse Hyperbolic Sine
IHS transformation suggested by Burbidge, Magee, and Robb (1988). The IHS is an alternative transformation that suits the distributional aspects of wealth data. It reduces the
influence of extreme values of wealth and is defined for zero values and thus, can handle
the excess observations of zero wealth.23 I estimate specification 1.2 with the dependent
variable being [Sinh−1 (Ait )−Sinh−1 (Ai(t−1) )]. Using this transformation, I report in Table
1.5 [Columns (2)] an estimate within the same range estimated earlier.
These results suggest that the depletion of TDAs upon job loss is highly sensitive to
the tax price of accessing retirement accounts. An unemployment shock is 51% more
damaging to 401(k) wealth in a penalty-free setting (post-55) compared to a setting where
withdrawals are penalized by a 10% tax. The policy importance of this findings emanates
from the current usage of the EWP as a policy lever to alleviate financial hardships. For
instance, in light of the current labor market downturn, the CARES act waived the EWP
for coronavirus-related distributions with a view to reduce the cost of resorting to 401(k)
savings during unemployment.24 While it can alleviate unemployment-related hardships,
the removal of the EWP can lead to a depletion of retirement savings with significant
consequences for retirement income adequacy, specifically for workers with a history of
unemployment shocks.
These results serve as guidance for policymakers considering the option to use the
early withdrawal penalty as a policy lever in response to similar future economic downturns.25 Additionally, the US pension system is highly in favor of a more flexible pension
system with relatively low cost of accessing pension savings compared to other develp
23. The IHS is defined as Sinh−1 (Ai ) =ln(Ai + 1 + A2i ).
24. CARES act waives the EWP on coronavirus-related distributions including for being diagnosed
with COVID-19 of for labor market shocks resulting from COVID-19. To be considered eligible to
this waiver, workers are asked to self-certify that they meet an eligibility requirement is based on selfcertification. https://www.tiaa.org/public/learn/prepare-unexpected/guiding-you-through-turbulenttimes/cares-act#20001002080502
25. Other countries have also adopted an income-contingent pre-retirement withdrawal penalty [Beshears
et al. 2015].
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oped economies [Beshears et al. 2015]. However, such preference for liquidity imposes a
trade-off between the benefits of being able to respond to pre-retirement job losses on one
hand and the depletion of retirement savings that might result from that flexibility on the
other hand. Accordingly, the estimates provided in Table 1.5 contribute to the debate on
the optimal liquidity of the pension system in the US.

1.5.2

Density analysis

The identifying assumption in this analysis is that a job loss immediately after the
age threshold 55 is not associated with unobservable factors influencing pension withdrawals, compared to a job loss just before 55. A potential threat to this analysis is the
probability of manipulation of the running variable; the timing of the layoff in this case.
This could be the case if employers and older workers jointly manipulate layoffs’ timings to provide workers with the option to cash-out their 401(k)’s penalty-free to help
them weather the shock of the layoff. Two main factors seriously weaken the credibility
of this threat. First, such manipulation would be costly for firms as it requires them to
keep workers, that would otherwise be laid-off, on their payrolls for additional time until
they reach the age threshold. Second, being costly for firms, such age-targeting layoff
strategy could only be implemented with workers that are very close to turning 55 which
seriously limits the potential and the feasibility of such strategy. However, if, hypothetically, this manipulation of layoffs’ timings is prevalent, the 401(k) pension asset outflows
documented in Figure 1.3 and Table 1.5 could reflect the effect of policy-induced job separations and their related 401(k) distributions, as opposed to the liquidity constrained
motives documented in this paper. In light of McCrary (2008), if this discontinuity in the
tax-price of accessing 401(k) funds induces strategic job separations at age 55, it would
reflect as a discontinuity in the likelihood of observing a job loss around the age cutoff
55. To test this hypothesis, I estimate the likelihood of observing a job separation due to a
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layoff at each age within the age range 50-59 using the following linear probability model:

Job LossiAget = α +

X

1[Ageit = A] × DA + γt + iAget

(1.3)

A6=54

Job LossiAget is an indicator function that equals one at the timing of a job loss for individual i aged Ageit at year t and zero otherwise. γt denotes year fixed-effects. iAget is an
idiosyncratic error term. Each coefficient DA quantifies the likelihood of observing a job
loss for employees aged A at year t, relative to an omitted category (age 54). Appendix
Figure A.2 plots the set of estimated coefficients DˆA ’s, showing no evidence of a discontinuity in the likelihood of observing a layoff at the cutoff age or at any age within the age
range in question. The almost flat pattern on the DˆA ’s significantly lessens the concerns
about policy-induced job separations at age 55.

1.5.3

Late-career job loss and IRA funds

Conducting a similar analysis for assets held in IRA accounts serves three purposes.
First, were these flows out of 401(k) pensions rolled over into IRAs?26 If yes, the observed
decumulation of 401(k) assets after age 55 would reflect a movement of funds between
different TDAs, rather than an unemployment-induced leakage of pension assets towards
non-retirement purposes. To address this possibility, I re-estimate specification 1.2 using
the growth rates of IRA assets as a dependent variable. The economically and statistically
insignificant estimate of β3 provided in table 1.5 [Column (3)] indicates that IRA assets do
not react differently in response to a job loss after 55 compared to one prior to 55. Hence,
the decumulation of 401(k) assets following a post-55 layoff is not accompanied by an
increase in IRA assets, which rules out the rollover hypothesis consistent with a leakage
of retirement funds out of the tax-deferred pension system.
26. The term rollover describes the transfer of funds between 401(k) and IRA accounts. Rollovers preserve
the tax-deferred status of the funds as opposed to a leakage of funds out of the tax-deferred pension system.
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Second, since IRAs are not eligible for a similar suspension of the EWP in the event
of a separation from service after age 55, the tax price of accessing IRA funds for job
losers remains constant around that age. Accordingly, the economically and statistically
insignificant response of IRA funds, estimated by βˆ3 , serves as a placebo test supporting
the results on 401(k) outflows.
Third, at age 59 12 , there is a similar discontinuity in the tax price of accessing IRA
funds. In fact, the EWP is completely removed regardless of employment status starting
that age. Appendix Figure A.3 provides a graphical illustration of the evolution of mean
IRA asset growth rates, net of fixed effects, among job losers and all other individuals by
age. I document a similar response of IRA asset growth rates of job losers immediately
following the removal of the EWP. Specifically, a job loss immediately after 59 12 triggers
a large and precipitous decumulation of IRA funds compared to a job loss prior to 59 12 .27
This result provides an additional piece of evidence on the effect of the removal of the
EWP on job loss-motivated withdrawal of pension assets.

1.6

UI as a substitute for private pension withdrawals

What role UI can play to mitigate the effects of late-career shocks on private pension
decumulation? By alleviating the income shocks resulting from job losses, generous unemployment benefits can reduce the marginal value of unemployment-motivated 401(k)
pension withdrawals relative to the value of keeping these funds within the tax-deferred
pension system (including the investment returns and tax benefits). Accordingly, I test the
hypothesis that the more generous state unemployment benefits, the less the 401(k) pension withdrawals made by older unemployed workers. To test this hypothesis, I estimate
27. Since I use integer values of age, the precipitous decumulation of IRA assets is observed exactly at age
61 (See Appendix Figure A.3).
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the following specification for the near-retirement population age 50-59:

Yist = α + β1 On Layof fit + β2 On Layof fit × M ax Benef itst + ηi + ζst + Xit Γ + ist
(1.4)
Similar to specification 1.2, the dependent variable is the annual growth rate of 401(k)
assets for worker i residing at state s at year t, holding the average asset growth rate for
each individual constant by accounting for person fixed-effects ηi . Layof fit is an indicator function that equals one if individual i had some weeks of layoff at year t and zero
otherwise. Layof fit is interacted with M ax Benef itst , the maximum dollar amount of unemployment benefits provided by state s at year t during the course of an unemployment
spell (in $1000 of benefits), computed as the product of the maximum weekly benefits
and the duration of benefits eligibility in weeks. M ax Benef itst is demeaned relative to
the average of the 46 states included in this analysis presented in Table 1.3. ζst holds
state-wide policies and shocks constant; Xit is a vector of person-specific time-varying
controls accounting for lagged versions of earnings, financial assets and liabilities owed
independently and jointly with spouse; α is an intercept term and ist is an idiosyncratic
error term.
Accordingly, β1 is an average association between being on layoff and 401(k) pension
savings rate. Among the unemployed, the coefficient of interest β2 quantifies the effect of
UI generosity on the flows of 401(k) savings, holding other state-wide policies and shocks
constant. Table 1.6 (column 1) shows that being on layoff is associated with 18.5% less
401(k) asset growth in the state with the average level of UI generosity. Most importantly,
the coefficient estimate βˆ2 shows that a $1000 increase in the upper bound of the total state
UI benefits, during the course of an unemployment spell, increases 401(k) asset accumulation by 7%. This estimated effect of an additional $1,000 of unemployment benefits
corresponds to helping older unemployed workers preserve an average of about $750
of 401(k) pension savings from flowing out of workers’ pension accounts during unem22

ployment spells.28 In the sample of states at hand (46 states during the periods 1996-1999
and 2001-2003), a one standard deviation change in maximum state unemployment benefits during the course of an unemployment spell, corresponding to $2,610, helps older
unemployed workers preserve approximately $1,950 of 401(k) pension assets.
[Table 1.6 about here]
Multiple arguments support a causal interpretation of this finding. Controlling for
state-year fixed effects absorb all (observed and unobserved) state-by-year variations, including state economic or policy shocks. Additionally, using an alternative specification
that does not account for state-year fixed effects, I estimate the effect of UI generosity on
individuals without a layoff in [Table 1.6: Column (2)]. Using this specification, I show
that M ax Benef itst has an insignificant average effect except on the unemployed. While
employed workers’ savings can be affected by UI through a precautionary motive channel [Engen and Gruber 2001], UI is expected to have a much more pronounced effect on
the primarily targeted population of the unemployed. Accordingly, the small magnitude
and the insignificance of the estimate of the coefficient on M ax Benef itst serves as a falsification test. Specifically, it indicates that state UI benefit generosity has no meaningful
association with the pension savings of the employed population who are ineligible for
UI.29
UI crowds out the need for pre-retirement 401(k) asset withdrawals. By preserving
these assets from depletion, UI boosts lifetime income and specifically, retirement income.
This increase in income is equal to the returns on these preserved assets and the tax advantages should these withdrawals be delayed. For instance, the geometric rate of nominal
return on defined contribution plans over 1990-2012 is in the range of 5.9-7.6% depending
28. This amount is the difference in the flow of assets out of 401(k) accounts among unemployed individuals having access to unemployment benefits of different generosity. Additionally, this flow of funds
measure also translates to an equivalent difference in the stock of pension assets among the unemployed
based on the state UI generosity.
29. To avoid selection into treatment, I also remove a very limited of observations corresponding to workers who moved between states.
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on plan size [Munnell, Aubry, Crawford, et al. 2015]. Accordingly, the average financial
return of preserving $750, due to a $1000 increase in maximum state UI generosity, is in
the range of $44-$57 per year of delay.

1.6.1

Interaction with precautionary non-tax-deferred savings

In addition to social insurance, jobless workers can also draw down their non-retirement
assets to smooth their consumption during unemployment spells. Using assets held outside of retirement accounts for consumption smoothing could be a less costly option compared to 401(k) withdrawals. Resorting to non-tax-deferred assets instead of 401(k)s can
help unemployed workers avoid the EWP and the income tax liabilities arising from pension withdrawals. In this context, assets held outside of retirement accounts also reduces
the marginal value of early 401(k) withdrawals. Workers with ample financial wealth held
outside of TDAs are less likely to resort to the more costly option of tapping their pension
accounts during unemployment. Accordingly, I make the hypothesis that the effect of UI
on pension withdrawals is likely to be smaller for workers with ample non-tax-deferred
wealth to rely on during unemployment and vice versa.
To this hypothesis, I allow for UI to have heterogeneous effects based on the availability of non-retirement precautionary wealth. I interact the amount of liquid financial
wealth held outside of retirement accounts immediately prior to the unemployment period, with state UI benefit generosity and layoff status. This includes assets held in checking and saving accounts, bonds, stocks, and funds held in own name and those held
jointly with spouse. Consistent with non-retirement wealth being a cheaper substitute
for pre-retirement pension withdrawals, the negative value of the coefficient estimate on
M ax Benef its × On Layof f × Liquid Assets indicates that UI generosity has a smaller
effect on those with ample non-retirement wealth. Conversely, increases in unemployment benefits reduce 401(k) pension withdrawals more for the most liquidity-constrained
workers; those with few assets held outside of retirement accounts. While UI does crowd
24

out the need for 401(k) pension withdrawals for more than 95% of the population, UI produces has almost zero effect on retirement savings of workers owning $100,000 of nontax-deferred assets, consistent with UI being more influential for liquidity constrained
workers.
[Table 1.7 about here]
While the availability of precautionary non-TDA savings can shield pension wealth,
Lusardi, Mitchell, and Oggero (2020) show that more recent cohorts of near-retirement
individuals hold more debt and less liquid assets compared to previous similarly aged
cohorts. Accordingly, the effect of UI is likely to become more influential as cohorts of
older workers become more financially fragile over time.

1.6.2

Factors influencing external validity

Further research is needed to test these findings in the context of the current COVID19 recession. The CARES act relief measures included both a suspension of the early
withdrawal penalty and an extension of unemployment benefits. The evidence provided
by this paper helps understand the effects of these two policies on older unemployed
workers’ retirement savings. However, for the current recession, two additional factors
may be considered. First, the economic contraction resulting from the current pandemic
is much stronger than the normal recessions during the period of the study 1996-1999
and 2001-2003. Second, older workers are particularly vulnerable to the health risks of
the pandemic. Accordingly, the health risks of taking a job could increase the utility of remaining unemployed. Employers might also further discriminate against older workers
to avoid potential liabilities or reputational damage about the safety of the work environment they maintain. Additionally, if older individuals get sick, their ability to search
for a job can be reduced. These factors suggest that older unemployed workers could
face longer unemployment durations and smaller chances of re-employment. While the
25

liquidity constraints arising from longer unemployment periods could actually intensify
pension asset withdrawals, higher unemployment benefits could still reduce this leakage of retirement funds, particularly given the recent extensions. However, loosing a job
during a severe contraction, such the COVID-19 one, significantly raises search costs and
post-displacement wage reductions [Merkurieva 2019]. These effects may discourage job
search leading to longer term unemployment, particularly for older workers. Accordingly, UI, being a short term measure limited by a maximum duration of eligibility would
not be a sufficient policy response to prevent leakage from retirement accounts in such
prolonged recessionary periods.

1.7

UI as a substitute for early social security benefits

Next, I test the hypothesis that more generous state UI benefits incentivize older job
losers to delay SS benefit claiming. The channel of this effect is similar to the effect of UI
on pre-retirement 401(k) pension withdrawals. An increase in unemployment benefits reduces the marginal value of early SS income relative to the actuarial gains of delaying the
claiming decision. Similar to avoiding 401(k) asset withdrawals, the decision to delay SS
benefits also has a financial return. Delaying claiming increments the benefit amount by
approximately 6.67% of the worker’s primary insurance amount for each year of benefits
delay (or 95 % per month).30
To test this hypothesis, I compare the likelihood of early (pre-65) SS benefit initiation by older workers subjected to job loss shocks at different ages and residing in states
having different levels of UI benefit generosity at different points of time. Accordingly,
I estimate the effect of job loss and of state unemployment benefit generosity on subsequent SS benefit initiation by job losers. I estimate the following regression specification
30. The penalty of early claiming increased over time. For cohorts born in 1937 or earlier, the penalty of
claiming at 62 is 20% of the PIA. The penalty of claiming at 62 increased to 25% of the PIA for cohorts born
between 1943-1954 and 30% for cohorts born on 1960 or later.
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separately for workers of age 61, 62, 63 and 64:
P r[SS incomet+1 > 0 | SS incomet = 0]istAg e = αAg e + β1Ag e Job Lossit

(1.5)

+ β2Ag e Job Lossit × M ax Benef itst + ζst + Xit Γ + ist ; Age = 61, 62, 63 and 64
The dependent variable is a binary variable that equals one if individual i residing
at state s reports some social security income at t+1 and zero otherwise, conditional on
reporting no social security income at t. Accordingly, a value of zero indicates delaying SS
claiming for at least one year. Job Lossit is equal to one if worker i experienced a job loss
at year t and zero otherwise. M ax Benef itst is the maximum amount of unemployment
benefits provided by state s at year t (expressed in $1000 and demeaned relative to the
average of the 46 states). ζst holds other state-wide policies and shocks constant. Xit is a
vector of person-specific controls, ist is an idiosyncratic error term and α is an intercept
term. Among workers of a given age, β1Ag e is the average propensity to initiate social
security benefits at t+1 in response to a job loss occurring at t compared to a non-job loser
in the state with the average generosity of unemployment benefits. Among job losers,
β2Ag e quantifies the average differential response between job losers having access to UI
systems of different generosity to an additional $1000 of maximum state UI benefits.31
I estimate this regression separately for workers of age 61, 62, 63 and 64. The set of
estimated β̂1Ag e ’s in Table 1.8 show that following a late career job loss, job losers have a
higher average propensity to immediately initiate their stream of social security benefits.
The set of coefficients’ estimates β̂2Ag e ’s address the research question and the contribution of this paper; specifically whether UI benefit generosity can reduce job loss-motivated
early SS benefits claiming and lead workers to opt for a higher benefit amount by claiming
later. For instance, β̂161 shows that following a job loss at age 61, job losers are 26% more
likely than non-job losers to initiate their social security stream of benefits immediately
31. I remove a very limited number of observations corresponding to workers who moved between states,
as well as those who ever reported disability as a reason for claiming social security.
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after at 62 in the state with the average generosity of state unemployment benefits. However, β̂261 shows that a $1,000 increase in state unemployment benefits reduces this likelihood by 4.5 percentage points. Accordingly, a $5,900 increase in the maximum amount of
state unemployment benefits over the course of an unemployment spell can fully reduce
the average propensity of job losers’ early claiming down to the same propensity of early
claiming by non-job losers.
Similarly, β̂162 shows that workers experiencing a job loss at age 62 are also 24% more
likely to have their stream of benefits running the year after at the state with the average
level of maximum unemployment benefits. However, β̂262 shows that a $1,000 additional
maximum state unemployment benefits reduces this likelihood by 9.1 percentage points.
Accordingly, a $2,600 increase in maximum state unemployment benefits can make job
losers on average not more likely to claim immediately after than non-job losers. A job
loss at age 63 produces the same effect with 48% higher likelihood of social security receipt at 64. β̂263 reflects a similar economically meaningful effect in reducing this likelihood by 11.6 percentage points but is statistically insignificant (p-value=0.235).
Finally, since both job losers and non-job losers are unlikely to delay benefits claiming beyond the full retirement age 65, estimating specification 1.5 for workers age 64
could serve as a falsification test. For those age 64, the small and statistically insignificant
β̂164 points to no statistically meaningful difference between job losers and non-job losers
claiming at 65, consistent with very few individuals delaying beyond 65 regardless of employment status [Appendix Figure A.1]. Consistently, the economically and statistically
insignificant coefficient estimate β̂264 indicates that state unemployment benefits provide
no incentive for job losers to delay claiming beyond age 65, the SS full retirement age.
[Table 1.8 about here]
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1.7.1

Intertemporal considerations

Delaying social security entails forgoing current benefits in exchange for higher future benefits. A one year delay in claiming raises the value of future benefits by 6.67%
of the worker’s primary insurance amount. A large number of studies emphasize that
delaying the claiming decision is financially advantageous for individuals with average
life expectancy and particularly for couples [Coile et al. 2002; Maurer et al. 2019; Meyer
and Reichenstein 2010; Shoven and Slavov 2014]. However, the exact income and utility
gains from a delay are person-specific and depend on subjective mortality expectations,
intertemporal elasticity elasticity of substitution, rate of time preference and worker’s
primary insurance amount. In the appendix, I use conservative assumptions to estimate
the resulting increase in the expected present discounted value of the stream of benefits
from an optimal delay for a single worker to be 0.62 and 3.34 PIAs for men and women
respectively.32
However, a job loss raises the marginal value of early SS benefits leading to a pattern of
early claiming by job losers in spite of the financial gains from a delay. In contrast, unemployment benefits reduce the marginal value of early SS benefits. As state unemployment
benefits increase, more job losers, who would otherwise claim immediately after the job
loss, become more likely to delay claiming. Through this analysis, I quantified the additional amount of unemployment benefits that would completely eliminate the average
excess propensity of early claiming by job losers compared to non-job losers. Accordingly,
by incentivizing job losers to delay claiming, unemployment benefits also raise future social security income leading to a net increase in the expected present discounted value of
the resources available to workers for retirement funding.
32. Gains from a delay can be much higher for married couples, particularly through its effects on survivors’ benefits [Coile et al. 2002; Meyer and Reichenstein 2010; Shoven and Slavov 2014]
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1.8

Conclusions

This paper provides evidence on a fast depletion of pension wealth resulting from
late-career unemployment shocks. These depletion decisions are highly sensitive to the
tax-price of accessing pension accounts. Most importantly, unemployment insurance alleviates job loss-related income shocks, reduces the marginal value of pre-retirement pension distributions, and leads workers to slow down their pension asset decumulation.
A similar mechanism is demonstrated for early Social Security benefits claiming. Unemployment insurance reduces the marginal value of early SS benefits and incentivizes
older unemployed workers to delay their SS claiming. UI enables them to avoid the loss
of market returns on their 401(k) savings and opt for a higher stream of social security
income. These results show that UI increases future retirement income, particularly for
individuals with a history of late-career unemployment shocks.
The policy importance of these pension withdrawal decisions emanates from their
timing. Pensions assets depleted at a near-retirement stage are less likely to be replaced.
Hence, the loss of market returns associated with these pension withdrawals is likely to
leave older workers with reduced retirement income and increased vulnerability to laterlife poverty. These results have important implications impacting nearly a million older
unemployed US workers, age 55-64, who experience generally longer average unemployment duration than their younger peers. Most importantly, these results shed light on an
unintended role of unemployment insurance. In addition to its consumption smoothing effect, it slows down pension wealth decumulation for the unemployed, leading to
positive long term consequences on their retirement income security.
These results will be even more relevant in light of the recent evidence on the increased financial vulnerability of the near-retirement population including the decline in
their savings and the increase in their debt holdings [Brown et al. 2019; Lusardi, Mitchell,
and Oggero 2020]. Those with a small buffer stock of non-pension wealth to face an unemployment shock will increasingly resort to retirement savings and early SS benefits
30

claiming. To support this point, I show that the mitigating effect of unemployment benefits on pension asset decumulation is more economically significant for more liquidity
constrained workers, those who lack savings outside of retirement accounts.
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1.9

Tables and Figures

Table 1.1: Wealth, Retirement Accounts and Earnings
for the near-retirement (50-59 years old) Population

Mean

Median Std. dev. Obs.

Near-retirement workers
IRAs
401(k)
Annual Earnings

9,526.8
0
13,393.8
0
27,748.0 19,992

Near-retirement Job Losers
IRAs
401(k)
Annual Earnings

8,686.1
0
33,101.1 1,476
11,586.8
0
37,345.0 1,476
20,572.3 14,714.6 24,460.1 1,476

in Own Name
Asset Type ($)

Mean

Checking Accounts
Interest Earning Accounts
Bonds
Stocks and Funds
Total Liquid Assets
Credit Card and Store Bills

142.7
3,095.2
1,132.1
14,555.9
18,928.7
1,040.6

Median Std. dev.
0
0
0
0
0
0

634.7
13,183.4
22,721.5
628,571.9
634,200.7
30,534.7

32,839.0 56,649
40190.1 56,649
36,480.6 56,649

Jointly with spouse
Mean
149.4
3,827.5
755.0
13,781.3
18,513.18
1,106.5

Median Std. dev.
0
0
0
0
0
0

508.0
12,131.2
9,573.2
646,341.0
646,900.1
24,079.8

Note: This table provides summary statistics of assets held in tax-deferred retirement accounts
(reported in own name) and liquid non-tax-deferred assets in addition to credit card and store bills
for the sample of 50-59 years old workers. The sample contains 56,649 worker-year observations.
Retirement savings, non-retirement wealth and credit card data are obtained from the SIPP topical
modules accompanying waves 3,6,9 and 12 (where available). Individuals’ annual earnings are
obtained by summing the stream of monthly earnings over each year of data. Values are reported
in 2000’s $.
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Table 1.2: Education and Demographic Characteristics
for the near-retirement 50-59 year old population

Education
Less than high school diploma
High school diploma
Some college,
diploma or associate degree
Bachelor’s degree or higher

17.1%
31.9%
27.7%
25.6%

Race
White
Black
Other

83.4%
12.2%
4.4%

Gender
Men
Women

47.5%
52.5%

Marital Status
Married
Widowed
Divorced
Separated
Never Married

70%
5.5%
18.2%
3.4%
6.5%

Number of Workers

22975

Note: This table provides demographic information for the near-retirement sample, age 5059 years old. Education and demographic characteristics approximately match the known U.S.
population averages for similar age categories in 2000 as provided by the U.S. 2000 decennial
census. Source: Author’s calculation based on the SIPP sample.

33

Table 1.3: UI State Benefit Generosity (1996-1999) and (2001-2003)

State UI Benefits
Mean Median Std. dev.
Weekly Benefits ($ 1000)
Benefits Duration (Weeks)
Maximum Benefits ($ 1000)
Increase in Maximum Benefits ($ 1000)
over the period 1996-2003
% Increase in Maximum Benefits
over the period 1996-2003
Number of States
States-Year

0.31
26.17
8.14

0.3
26
7.77

0.09
0.82
2.61

2.21

2.07

1.29

32

31
46
322

15

Note: This table provides summary statistics of for the legal parameters defining the generosity of
state unemployment benefits through the period of the study (1996-1999) and (2001-2003). Source:
Data on the significant provisions of state UI laws are provided by the U.S. Department of Labor
and compiled by Hsu, Matsa, and Melzer (2018). Values reported in nominal dollars.

34

Table 1.4: Sample Size of employed and laid-off workers with 401(k) accounts at each
age for the 50-59 years old population

Sample Size per Age
Workers of Age:
401(k) Account Owners
Employed 401(k) owners
Job losers with 401(k)’s

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

57

1900 1775 1622 1531 1469 1331 1148 1049
45
43
38
38
33
33
27
14

58

59

895
23

855
29

All workers including non-401(k) owners
Employed
6025 5607 5262 4855 4689 4448 4062 3678 3306 3154
Job Losers
210 198 158 172 152 144 128 126
95
101
Job Separation Rate (%)
3.49 3.53 3.00 3.54 3.24 3.24 3.15 3.43 2.87 3.20
Out of the Labor Force
864 899 900 936 994 1023 1056 1111 1136 1226
No. of workers
Workers with 401(k)s
401(k) Ownership Rate (%)
Layoff Events

22975
7013
30.52
1,476

Note: This table provides the sizes of the two samples used to draw figure 1.3 including employed
and laid-off 401(k) account owners at each age within the age range 50-59 years old. 323 job loss
events correspond to individuals with 401(k) accounts. Source: Author’s calculation based on the
SIPP sample.

35

Table 1.5: Unemployment-motivated 401(k) Pension Asset Withdrawal
by the near-retirement population (age 50-59 years old)

(1)
(2)
(3)
∆ log (401(k)Assets + 10) ∆ Sinh−1 (401(k)Assets) ∆ log (IRA Assets + 10)
Job Lossit × 1[Age > 55]

-0.511*
(0.287)

-0.654*
(0.396)

0.0337
(0.250)

Job Lossit

-0.0596
(0.142)
-0.0433
(0.0847)

-0.132
(0.195)
-0.0782
(0.114)

-0.0796
(0.115)
-0.0148
(0.0797)

1[Age>55]

Person time-varying controls
Person FE
State-Year FE
Worker-Year Observations
Number of Workers
R2

X
X
X
X
X
X
32,090
32,090
13371
13,371
0.286
0.288
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

X
X
X
32,090
13,371
0.270

Note: This table reports the coefficient estimates for specification 1.2 for the population of
age 50-59 years old using two alternative wealth transformations: ∆ log (401(k)Assets + 10) and
∆ Sinh−1 (401(k)Assets). The estimate in column (1) shows that a job loss after age 55 leads
to a 51 percent larger decline in 401(k) pension savings compared to a job loss prior to age 55.
Economically and statistically insignificant response of IRA assets reported in column (3) indicates
that flows out of 401(k) pensions were not rolled over to IRA accounts, which implies a leakage of
retirement savings out of the tax-deferred pension system. Person time-varying controls include
lagged versions of other liquid taxable assets held by the worker, earnings, credit card debt, store
bills and rent (or mortgage payments). Standard errors are clustered at the worker’s level.

36

Table 1.6: The Mitigating Effects of Unemployment Insurance
on 401(k) Asset Decumulation by older unemployed workers
(Population age 50-59 years old)

(1)
∆ log(401(k)Assets + 10)

(2)
∆ log(401(k)Assets + 10)

0.0720***
(0.0209)

0.0697***
(0.0203)

-0.184*
(0.100)

-0.194*
(0.101)

M ax Benef its ($1000) × On Layof f

On Layof f

M ax Benef its ($1000)

0.0266
(0.0535)

Person time-varying controls
X
Person FE
X
State-Year FE
X
State-Year Controls
7
State FE
7
Year FE
7
Worker-Year Observations
32,090
Number of Workers
13371
Number of States
46
R2
0.286
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

X
X
7
X
X
X
32,090
13,371
46
0.281

Note: This table reports the coefficient estimates for specification 1.4 for the near-retirement
population (50-59 years old) with 401(k) asset growth as the dependent variable in two specifications with and without state-year fixed effects. Person time-varying controls include lagged
versions of other liquid taxable assets held by the worker and those jointly held with spouse,
earnings, credit card debt, store bills and rent or mortgage payments. In column (2), state-level
controls include lagged versions of wage levels, per capita income and unemployment rates. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Table 1.7: Interaction of UI with Self-insurance Assets (Precautionary financial assets
held outside of retirement accounts)

∆ log(401(k)Assets + 10)
M ax Benef its ($1000) × On Layof f

0.0918***
(0.0211)

M ax Benef its ($1000) × On Layof f × Liquid Assets

-0.0922***
(0.0292)
-0.167*
(0.0944)

On Layof f

Person time-varying controls
Person FE
State-Year FE
Worker-Year Observations
R2
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

X
X
X
32,090
0.288

Note: This table reports the coefficient estimates for specification 1.4 for the population aged
50-59 years old with 401(k) asset growth as the dependent variable with an additional interaction
term between layoff status, unemployment benefit generosity and precautionary non-retirement
savings held outside of retirement accounts (including checking and savings accounts, bonds and
stocks measured in $100,000s). Person time-varying controls include lagged versions of other liquid taxable assets held by the worker (and those jointly held with spouse), earnings and rent (or
mortgage payments) and controls for pairwise combinations of layoff status, UI benefits generosity and liquid non-retirement assets. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Table 1.8: The Mitigating Effect of Unemployment Insurance
on Early Social Security Claiming Behavior

P r[SS I ncomet+ 1 > 0 | SS I ncomet = 0]i stA g e
Panel A: Individuals age 61
J ob Loss

0.263***
(0.0785)

M ax Benef its($1000) × J ob Loss

-0.0448*
(0.0260)

State-Year FE

X

Observations
R2

1,268
0.157

Panel B: Individuals age 62
0.243**
(0.109)

J ob Loss

M ax Benef its($1000) × J ob Loss

-0.0906**
(0.0354)

State-Year FE

X

Observations
R2

814
0.147

Panel C: Individuals age 63
J ob Loss

0.477***
(0.162)

M ax Benef its($1000) × J ob Loss

-0.110
(0.0912)

State-Year FE

X

Observations
R2

540
0.217

Panel D: Individuals age 64 (Placebo test)
J ob Loss

0.0904
(0.0881)

M ax Benef its($1000) × J ob Loss

0.0116
(0.0725)

State-Year FE

X

Observations
R2

434
0.232
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: This table provides the coefficient estimates for specification 1.5 estimated separately
for individuals of age 61, 62, 63 and 64. For workers age 61, 62 and 63, a job loss increases the
propensity to initiate social security benefits immediately after at 62, 63 and 64 respectively. State
unemployment benefit generosity reduces this likelihood and incentivizes older job losers to delay
their social security benefits claiming. Unemployment benefits do not incentivize delays in social
security benefit receipt beyond the full retirement age, 65. All regressions control for gender,
marital status and lagged earnings. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Figure 1.1: Age Profile of IRA and Employer-Sponsored 401(k) Assets
Figure 1A

Figure 1B

Note: The upper figure illustrates the age profile of the population average asset holdings
(in 2000’s $) in IRA and 401(k) accounts. The two dashed vertical lines indicate the 59 12 and 70 12
age thresholds, corresponding to the removal of the Early Withdrawal Penalty and the Required
Minimum Distribution respectively. The lower figure illustrates the age profile of the average
growth rate of 401(k) asset holdings. The dashed vertical lines indicates the 59 21 age threshold,
corresponding to the removal of the Early Withdrawal Penalty. Two lines are fitted before and
after the removal of the penalty. A one-off step decline in 401(k) asset growth rates is observed
immediately after the removal of the penalty at age 59 12 . Source: SIPP 1996 and 2001 Asset topical
modules.
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Figure 1.2: Geographic Distribution of Regular State Unemployment Benefits
Changes by quartile over the period 1996-2003

Note: The figure describes the geographic distribution of the changes in unemployment insurance over time by quartile. Darker shades of blue indicate larger increases in state unemployment
benefits over the period 1996-2003. Source: Hsu, Matsa, and Melzer (2018).
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Figure 1.3: Average Growth Rates of Assets held in Employer-Sponsored 401(k)
pensions following a Job Loss at Different Ages around age 55 compared to employed
workers

Note: The figure plots the average growth rates of employer-sponsored 401(k) pensions by age
within the range 50-59 years old net of person fixed effects, for job losers and non-job losers. The
treatment group (fitted blue line) is the average 401(k) asset growth rates for the population that
experienced a job loss at each age. The control group (fitted red line) consists of the average
growth rates for the population that didn’t experience a layoff at that age. The dashed vertical
line indicates age 55 at which the tax-price (EWP) of unemployment-motivated access to 401(k)
accounts changes from 10% to zero. Only 401(k) account owners are considered for the purpose
of this illustration. Source: SIPP Asset data linked to labor market histories collected from SIPP
core modules.
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Chapter 2
The Propagation of Local Credit Shocks:
Evidence from Hurricane Katrina
2.1

Introduction

How do local shocks propagate through an interconnected financial system, and what
are the real market effects of these spillovers? I show that a credit shock, induced by
hurricane Katrina in a small and contained area, propagated through the financial system
to lead to persistent and significant effects on housing prices, residential development
and credit supply across the United States. Financial linkages served as a channel for
spillovers from disaster areas towards the undamaged ones. The novelty of this paper,
compared to the literature on the transmission of credit shocks, is the documentation of
sizeable credit and real markets’ effects of these spillovers in regions that are very distant
to the location of the physical shock of the hurricane. Katrina induced a one-off drop
in housing price growth, a persistently lower house price level, and a negative shock to
residential development in regions that were undamaged by the storm and are geographically distant to disaster areas. These spillovers were proportional to the strength of the
financial ties between these regions and storm-affected areas. This paper is the first to
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provide a detailed demonstration of the transmission mechanism of financial spillovers
between regions.
I document the following causal chain. First, in the aftermath of a natural disaster,
insurance, federal assistance and reconstruction needs create a significant housing and
mortgage demand surge in the damaged areas [Cortés and Strahan 2017]. Regarding Katrina, I document a surge in construction and mortgage credit indicators in disaster areas
immediately following the storm. This includes a surge in the number of building permits
issued, an abnormal growth of the housing stock, loan origination volumes and housing
prices in Katrina-damaged areas. In addition, I observe a surge in average loan approval
rates in disaster areas compared to the neighboring intact ones. In fact, in September 2005,
the Federal Reserve forecast the recovery process to contribute almost

1
2

percentage point

to the growth of real GDP in 2006, driven by the federal aid package.1
Second, in response to this abnormal demand for housing and mortgages, financially
constrained multi-market banks increased loan supply and market entry to disaster areas
at the expense of the undamaged regions. This finding is supported by a positive interest rate differential between Louisiana and Mississippi, and the rest of the country, after
the storm. Third, this re-allocation of resources towards disaster regions led to a credit
tightening in the undamaged areas. In turn, this contraction put downward pressure on
housing prices and dampened construction in the undamaged areas that had strong financial ties to Katrina-hit markets, starting immediately after the storm, exactly in the
fourth quarter of 2005.
This causal chain is rationalized by the flow of capital within banks and the role of
banks’ headquarters in efficiently allocating resources between different areas. Financial
institutions operating simultaneously in multiple local markets create financial linkages
between these markets [Landier, Sraer, and Thesmar 2017]. Local loan demand shocks
1. Current Economic and Financial Conditions: Summary and Outlook. Prepared for the Federal Open
Market Committee by the staff of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, September 14, 2005.
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC20050920gbpt120050914.pdf
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could lead multi-market banks either to re-allocate resources towards the regions experiencing positive demand shocks, or away from the ones witnessing negative demand
shocks [Berrospide, Black, and Keeton 2016]. I provide two complementary pieces of evidence supporting the hypothesis of bank’s geographic re-allocation of resources, towards
booming disaster areas and away from the undamaged ones. First, holding all banks’
characteristics constant, banks headquartered outside of the Southern United States were,
on average, 4.25 percentage points more likely to enter Katrina-hit local markets, than entering the undamaged regions in the U.S. in the post-Katrina period. Second, banks that
had historically been present in Katrina areas abruptly reduced mortgage loan application approval rates in the undamaged areas immediately after Katrina, on average, by
1.24 percentage points, holding all undamaged local area characteristics constant including local demand.
To the extent that banks are financially constrained, profit maximization requires them
to shift resources between projects based on their risk-adjusted returns; a ‘winner-picking’
strategy, as framed by Stein (1997). This re-allocation is rationalized by three findings.
Consistent with Giroud and Mueller (2015), financially unconstrained banks didn’t substitute towards disaster areas after the storm. Second, there is evidence on higher poststorm mortgage interest rates in Louisiana and Mississippi relative to the rest of the country, consistent with the observed positive aggregate demand shock boosting construction
and credit markets in disaster areas. Third, consistent with Gilje, Loutskina, and Strahan
(2016) and Chakraborty, Goldstein, and MacKinlay (2018), securitization did not fully alleviate the constraints associated with the post-Katrina credit expansion in disaster areas.
I document significant increases in the funding originated in disaster areas and retained
on banks’ balance sheets after Katrina. These points suggest that constrained banks took
advantage of higher risk-adjusted returns in disaster markets, at the expense of their positions in the undamaged areas.
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Having established these facts, I test the hypothesis that this re-allocation of resources,
away from the undamaged areas, put downward pressure on housing prices and residential development in the undamaged regions. Using a measure of geographic financial linkages to disaster areas, I report a 0.89% post-storm decline in home values in the
county with the average strength of financial linkages to Katrina-hit areas. I also report
similar findings at the Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA) level. As shown in figure 2.1,
housing price trends in the treatment and control groups of local markets (CBSAs) remained superimposed for an extended period of time prior to the exact timing of Katrina.
Additionally, I exploit the heterogeneity between local markets in their housing supply
elasticity to show that elastic markets responded to this credit disruption with smaller
price declines and larger declines in construction.
[Figure 2.1 about here]
The identifying assumption is that, in the absence of Katrina, areas with different financial ties to disaster areas would have continued to trend similarly, in terms of housing
prices and quantities. This assumption is supported by four findings. Housing price
trends are superimposed for an extended period of time prior to Katrina. The divergence
of trends occurred exactly in the fourth quarter of 2005, immediately after Katrina (late
August 2005). Second, I report corroborating evidence on a banks’ credit supply contraction in the undamaged regions, occurring simultaneously. Third, I document a simultaneous abnormal banks’ market entry, mortgage origination and a construction boom in
Katrina-damaged areas, immediately after the hurricane, consistent with the hypothesis
of banks’ geographic re-allocation. Fourth, these impacts hold in markets that are far
away from Katrina-hit areas, which lessen concerns about potential confounders related
to the storm such as labor markets spillovers.
Consistent with a credit tightening in the undamaged regions, there is also evidence
on an increase in local mortgage interest rates, after the storm, in the undamaged markets
with strong financial ties to disaster areas relative to the ones with weak financial ties.
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This paper identifies significant real market effects emanating from the propagation
a climate-related shock through banks’ Internal Capital Markets ICMs. For instance,
Berrospide, Black, and Keeton (2016) show that multi-market banks reduced local mortgage lending in response to their exposure to mortgage distress in other distant markets during the 2007-09 crisis. Consistent with Stein (1997)’s ‘winner-picking’ strategy,
Chakraborty, Goldstein, and MacKinlay (2018) find that banks exposed to booming housing markets allocate more resources to mortgage lending at the expense of commercial
lending. ICMs are also a channel for international spillovers [Peek and Rosengren 1997,
Cetorelli and Goldberg 2012 and Hale, Kapan, and Minoiu 2020]. Peek and Rosengren
(1997) identified a credit supply shock resulting from a credit tightening by Japanese
banks operating in the U.S., in response to a collapse in Japanese equity markets in the
early 1990s. Cortés and Strahan (2017) report evidence on disaster-induced local demand
shocks leading small banks to re-allocate resources towards damaged areas. The propagation of local shocks within firms’ internal networks was also documented for nonfinancial firms [Giroud and Mueller 2019].
The assumption behind these studies is that financial constraints make it costly for
banks to raise external capital and limit their ability to pursue different investment opportunities simultaneously, leading them to re-allocate resources efficiently between projects,
in search for higher yields. A body of literature attributes these constraints to informational frictions Stein (1997, 1998). Banks’ financial constraints also attracted attention,
regarding their relation to the bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission,
including studies reporting evidence on financially constrained banks being more sensitive to monetary policy shocks [Ashcraft 2006, Kashyap and Stein 2000, Kishan and
Opiela 2000]. My findings are also consistent with Gilje, Loutskina, and Strahan (2016)
and Chakraborty, Goldstein, and MacKinlay (2018) who emphasize the limitations of securitization in alleviating banks’ vulnerability to local funding shocks.
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Second, I contribute to a literature on the causal link between credit supply and housing prices [Di Maggio and Kermani 2017, Favara and Imbs 2015, Loutskina and Strahan
2015]. Specifically, I exploit a plausibly exogenous variation between different local markets, emanating from the heterogeneity in their financial ties to Katrina-hit regions, to
identify the effect on housing prices and construction.
This paper is relevant beyond the scope of hurricane Katrina. Shocks to local economies
can create abnormally high or abnormally low local demand for construction and lending. These shocks could include extreme weather events or other economic fluctuations.
In a financially integrated system, these local shocks can have geographically widespread
and persistent repercussions. Understanding these linkages helps detect and rationalize
the ramifications of these shocks beyond their initial boundaries.2
This study has three policy and business strategy implications. First, to the extent
that banks are capital constrained, local shocks influence their credit supply decisions
in other markets and in turn, housing markets’ stability in these other markets. Policies
aiming to support local housing markets on a regional basis, such as disaster aid, put unintended downward pressure on non-disaster markets by drawing resources away from
them. Second, community banks play a housing market stabilization role. Being unexposed to distant shocks, they partially shield their local markets from external shocks.3
Finally, post-disaster reconstruction create significant opportunities for banks. In fact,
banks strategically and swiftly responded by intensifying their entry to disaster markets,
after Katrina.
2. Regarding Katrina, this time-persistency and geographic ramifications seem to have been downplayed. In November 2005, the Federal Open Market Committee FOMC considered that the economic
developments in disaster regions ‘did not pose a more persistent threat to the overall economy’ and that the ‘disruptions to aggregate economic activity and employment from the hurricanes were likely to be limited and temporary’.
Minutes of the meeting of the FOMC, 11/1/2005. Similar arguments were made in support of the decision
to raise the Federal Fund Rate in September 2005, Minutes of the meeting of the FOMC, 9/20/2005.
3. By analogy, the international transmission of credit market fluctuations through global banks’ ICMs
led some countries to adopt protectionist measures, such as ‘ring-fencing’, to limit the penetration of international banking activities in domestic markets [Goldberg and Gupta 2013].
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2.2

Background, Data and Descriptive Analysis

I define Katrina-hit regions as the areas that were considered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) ‘Major Disaster Declaration’ areas and made eligible for individual and / or public government assistance. Katrina disaster areas encompassed the state of Louisiana, the state of Mississippi, 22 counties in the West of Alabama
and 11 counties in western and southern Florida.4

2.2.1

Financial Institutions’ Market Shares

I use the year 2000’s cross section of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)
Data to compute the market shares of each mortgage lender in each Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA)5 and each county in the U.S. HMDA provides loan application-level
information on the location of the property in question, the amount of the requested loan,
decisions made by lenders regarding applications, regulatory information about lenders,
demographic and income information about applicants. Using the information provided
on the loan amount and the origination / denial decision for all lenders and loans covered by HMDA, I compute the market share of each lender i in each CBSA or county j as
follows:6
Wij =

Lending by Institutioni in CBSAj or Countyj
T otal M ortgage Lending in CBSAj or Countyj

(2.1)

4. This includes four FEMA disasters: Disaster 1602 for Florida declared in 8/28/2005, Disaster 1603 for
Louisiana declared in 8/29/2005, Disaster 1604 for Mississippi declared in 8/29/2005 and Disaster 1605
for Alabama in 8/29/2005. Consequently these regions were made eligible for public and / or individual
Federal assistance. A map of these FEMA disaster declarations is provided in Appendix Figure B.1. In
Appendix Figure B.2, I provide an overview of the extent and the distribution of the damage in these areas.
5. Core-Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs) are either micro or metropolitan statistical areas. This notion
refers to a set of counties clustered around one core of at least 10,000 population. The criteria of clustering
these counties together into CBSAs is the level of social and economic integration with a common core
measured through commuting ties.
6. I include originations and loan purchases in this definition.
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2.2.2

Historic Market Presence (Lenders’ Geographic Footprint) in Katrina areas

Second, for each mortgage lender i, I compute a measure of its historic market presence in Katrina-hit regions (Geographic footprint), defined as the ratio of loans originated
or purchased in Katrina-hit counties to the total mortgage lending of the institution in
year 2000 defined as:

P Expi =

Lending by Institutioni in Katrina Areas
T otal M ortgage Lending by Institutioni

(2.2)

The sample of mortgage lenders at hand includes 7458 mortgage lenders in year 2000.
Table (1) provides summary statistics for the total mortgage lending portfolio of these
institutions and two measures of geographic diversification: the number of CBSAs and
counties an institution operates in. Among these lenders, 1,358 had some geographic
footprint in Katrina areas. In 2000, the median lender operated in 5 CBSAs or 9 counties,
had a yearly mortgage lending volume of about $10 million and no footprint in Katrina
areas. However, the distribution is skewed to the right with the average lender operating
in 29 CBSAs or 67 counties, with a yearly mortgage lending of about $163 million and 4.8
% of its loans originated in Katrina areas. Accordingly, lenders with market presence in
Katrina areas were, on average, larger institutions with more geographically diversified
loan portfolios.
[Table (1) about here]

2.2.3

Geographic Financial Inter-linkages

Financial linkages between undamaged CBSA (county) j to Katrina-hit areas are given
by sum of the Katrina footprint of each one of the N mortgage lenders serving CBSA
(county) j weighted by their respective market shares in the CBSA’s (county) local mort50

gage market:
Linkj =

N
X

Wij × P Expi

(2.3)

i=1

This measure of inter-linkages is calculated using HMDA data for all CBSAs and urban counties in the U.S. It measures the extent to which a region is financially connected
to Katrina-hit regions via common mortgage finance institutions. I compute it for all
undamaged CBSA’s and counties using the HMDA 2000’s cross-section. High values of
the index Linkj indicate that significantly important financially institutions in CBSAj
(countyj ) also have significant geographic footprint in Katrina-damaged regions. Low
value of Linkj corresponds to a local mortgage mortgage market in which financial institutions had negligible market presence in Katrina areas. The map in Figure 2.2 illustrates
the relative strength of financial ties to Katrina-hit areas of all urban counties, after the
removal of Katrina-hit states and the four adjacent states (Arkansas, Georgia, Tennessee
and Texas).
[Figure 2.2 about here]
Due to the near universal coverage of HMDA encompassing about 90% of mortgage
activities in the U.S. [Dell’Ariccia, Igan, and Laeven 2012],7 these measures of market
share, geographic footprint and financial linkages provide an accurate picture of mortgage finance networks in the U.S.

2.2.4

Contribution of different types of institutions to Financial linkages

To identify the types of financial institutions that are responsible for these linkages, I
decompose the financial connectedness measure introduced in equation (3) to an aggre7. HMDA reporting is governed by Regulation C and covers: 1) All depository institutions whose total
assets exceed an asset threshold ($45 million in 2018), have at least one branch in a Metropolitan Statistical
Area MSA, originated a minimum number of loans and 2) All Non-Depository institutions whose total
assets exceed a threshold ($10 million in 2018), have a branch office in an MSA and originated a minimum
number of loans.
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gation of linkages via the different types of HMDA-reporting institutions.8 Accordingly,
equation (3) can be re-written as follows:9

Linkj =

Nk
K X
X

Wikj × P Expik

(2.4)

k=1 i=1

Where Nk is the number of mortgage finance institutions i’s serving CBSA or county j
and regulated by agency k. The financial connectedness of an area j to Katrina-hit regions
is the sum of its connectedness via national banks, state banks, thrifts, credit unions and
mortgage companies. I compute and report in Table (2) each of these components for the
universe of counties outside of Katrina-hit regions and their adjacent states; that is after
dropping the counties located in Louisiana, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Tennessee, Arkansas and Texas. Consistent with Landier, Sraer, and Thesmar (2017), I show
that financial institutions of national scope, mainly national banks NBs and mortgage
companies MCs, have higher contributions to geographic financial linkages. Conversely,
due to their more localized lending activities, state banks, credit unions and thrifts have
much smaller contributions to these linkages. Together, NBs and MCs are responsible for
about 70% of these inter-linkages.
[Table 2.2 about here]
8. Based on the regulator reported, HMDA data allows to distinguish between six types of financial institutions: National Banks regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), State-Chartered
Banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System, State-Chartered Banks that are not members of the
Federal Reserve System regulated by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Thrifts supervised
by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), Credit Unions regulated by the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) and Non-depository mortgage companies regulated by the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD).
9. Under the US dual banking system, two different regulatory structures co-exist for commercial banks.
National banks are federally regulated by the OCC while state banks are state-chartered and regulated
by state-level regulators. While national banks must be members of the Federal Reserve System, statechartered banks may join if they meet certain requirements. On the other hand, mortgage companies are
non-depository financial institutions and are regulated by the Department of Housing and Urban Development.
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2.2.5

Data on Banks’ Mortgage and Financial Activities:

Regarding Banks’ mortgage activities, I use cross-sections of HMDA data to form a
panel spanning the period 2001-2009. Based on the loan level information provided by
HMDA, I compute banks’ mortgage loan approval rates in each local market at each year,
their likelihood of entry and lending volumes in different local markets. To provide a
more comprehensive picture of the banks studied, I link banks’ mortgage activities to
their financial statements from the end-of-year Quarterly Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports) maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.

2.2.6

Other Housing, Credit and Local Labor Markets Data Sources:

I use quarterly CBSA-level and yearly county-level Housing Price Indices made available by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). The FHFA HPI measures the movement of single-family house prices, based on repeated sales or refinancing transaction on
same properties, whose mortgages were purchased or securitized by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, at multiple points of time.
To measure residential development activities, I compile data from the Building Permits Survey (BPS) maintained by the US Census Bureau. The BPS aggregates, at the
county-year level, data from individual permits forms (Form C-404) including information on the number of buildings and housing units authorized, in addition to the monetary valuation of the construction. I also use annual county-level estimates of the housing
stock, measured as the number of housing units, provided by the Census Bureau. To
proxy for housing supply elasticity at the county level, I use disaggregated land unavailability measures computed by Lutz and Sand (2017) as the percentage of land unavailable
for development due to topographic factors.
Using HMDA Loan Application Register data, I compute several measures of mortgage market activity at the county level, including average county-year level loan ap-
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proval rates, yearly count of loan applications per county and total yearly mortgage
lending per county. I also use interest rate data at the state level and for a set of large
metropolitan areas from the FHFA interest rate survey. Finally, I collect local labor market data including, civilian labor force, employment and unemployment, from the Local
Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

2.3

Link 1: Abnormal Housing and Credit Market activities in the Katrina-hit areas

I verify the first link in the causal chain by testing the hypothesis about the emergence
of abnormal housing and mortgage markets’ activities in Katrina-hit regions, consistent
with a reconstruction boom fuelled by disaster aid and insurance payments.10 In a simple
IS-LM-AS-AD framework, this could be illustrated as a rightward shift to the IS curve,
reflecting a positive shock to aggregate demand, leading to a a stronger demand for credit,
an expansion of output and a higher price level.11 I use the following specification to test
these predictions by documenting the change in local housing and mortgage markets’
activities in disaster areas, compared to neighboring non-disaster areas around the timing
of Katrina:

Activityit = α + ηi + ζt +

X

1[τ = t] × Disasteri × µτ + it

(2.5)

τ 6=2004

10. Reconstruction & local demand were plausibly fuelled by several government programs. These include, but are not limited to, the National Flood Insurance Program, low interest rate disaster loans from
the Small Business Administration, as well as the Department of Housing & Urban Development Community Development Block Grants. See Gallagher and Hartley (2017) for a comprehensive discussion of
different disaster aid programs deployed in the aftermath of Katrina.
11. While there were significant migration flows out of disaster areas, the reduction in the housing stock
exceeded the reduction in population causing a net positive housing demand shock in disaster areas. This
led to a significant surge in housing prices after the storm. Construction boomed in the disaster areas to
meet the abnormal demand on housing in the aftermath of the storm [Vigdor 2008].
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Activityit is a measure of housing or credit market activity in county i at year t. The
effects predicted by a simple IS-LM-AS-AD framework can be proxied by building permits issuance, the growth of the housing stock (output expansion), home values (price
level) and mortgage lending growth. Additionally, to illustrate the average response of
banks’ loan supply in disaster areas, I use the average county-year level loan application
approval rate as a dependent variable. ηi and ζt denote county and year fixed effects respectively. 1[τ = t] are a set of indicator functions equalling one at their corresponding
years and zero otherwise. Disasteri is a time-invariant dummy that equals one if county i
was declared a disaster area by one of the four FEMA major disaster declarations related
to Katrina and zero otherwise. For the purpose of this test, I limit the areas considered
to the set of counties in the four states that were fully or partially impacted by hurricane
Katrina including Alabama, Florida, Louisiana and Mississippi. Accordingly, treatment
counties include 179 counties that were included by Katrina-related disaster declarations.
Control counties include the set of counties in Alabama and Florida that were not declared disaster areas. These areas include Eastern Alabama, Central Florida and most of
North Florida.12 The coefficients of interest are the pattern on the µτ ’s that capture the
difference in activity measures between disaster and non-disaster counties in each year,
relative to an omitted category (the average difference between these two sets of counties
in the year before the hurricane 2004) normalized to be zero.
Plots of regression estimates µτ ’s shown, in Figures 2.3 and 2.4, point to zero or constant difference between various market activity indicators in the treatment and control
groups prior to the hurricane, implying superimposed or parallel trends. Consistent with
Cortés and Strahan (2017) and Vigdor (2008), the estimates point to a booming demand
for housing and mortgages in disaster areas, starting exactly after the hurricane, relative
to the neighboring undamaged counties. This includes a sharp surge in residential devel12. While I use parts of Alabama & Florida as the control group, the same pattern of results holds for different control groups such as the set of undamaged counties in the U.S. South and Non-Southern counties.
For different choices of the control group, construction and mortgage lending activities indicate a significant
demand boom in disaster areas in the post storm period.

55

opment (building permits issuance), faster growth of the housing stock, faster increases
in mortgage loans’ applications and faster growth of total lending volumes.
I also document a significant surge in mortgage loan application approval rates in disaster areas, relative to the neighboring undamaged counties, consistent with a significant
flow of capital towards disaster areas in the aftermath of the hurricane.13 This abnormal
market activity did not dissipate swiftly. Different housing and mortgage market indicators in the damaged areas remained abnormally high relative to their pre-storm levels and
to the control group, for at least five years after the storm, consistent with the long-term
reconstruction process in Katrina-damaged areas. In fact, after more than ten years after
Katrina, some of the mostly damaged areas didn’t reach their pre-Katrina population and
housing stock levels.14
[Figures 2.3 and 2.4 about here]

2.4

Link 2: Within-Banks Resource Re-allocation and Banks’
‘Winner-Picking’ Strategy

2.4.1

Capital Flows Towards Disaster Regions

I verify the second link in the causal chain by showing that booming disaster areas,
attracted banks’ capital away from the undamaged ones. To demonstrate this link, I start
by showing that multi-market banks, headquartered outside of the American South,15

16

13. This observation is also consistent with Cortés and Strahan (2017)’s argument about regulators urging
financial institutions to increase credit availability in disaster areas.
14. https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/random-samplings/2016/05/after-hurricane-katrinawhere-are-they-now.html
15. I use the U.S. Census Bureau wide definition of the South, as the region including: Delaware, the
District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia,
Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma and Texas. I use the address
reported in HMDA Transmittal Sheets as the address of banks’ headquarters. Being headquartered that far,
these banks are plausibly otherwise unaffected by the storm.
16. Similar to Gilje, Loutskina, and Strahan (2016), this analysis is restricted to banking institutions including OCC-regulated national banks, state banks reporting the Federal Reserve as their main regulator
and state banks reporting the FDIC as their main regulator.
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were more likely to enter local markets in disaster regions compared to entering undamaged markets in the post Katrina period, consistent with a flow of capital towards disaster
areas. To empirically document this statement, I estimate the following linear probability
model:

M arket Entryict = α + ηic + γit +

X

1[τ = t] × Katrinac × µτ + ict

(2.6)

τ 6=2004

M arket Entryict is a binary indicator that equals one if bank i originated at least one
loan in CBSA c at year t and zero otherwise, conditional on having received at least
one application in year t regarding a property in CBSA c. Accordingly, M arket Entryict
measures banks’ entry / exit decisions to different local markets at the extensive margin.17 Katrinac is a time-invariant dummy variable that equals one for CBSAs located
in Louisiana or Mississippi, and zero otherwise. 1[τ = t] is a set of indicator functions
equaling one at their corresponding year and zero otherwise. The specification at hand
holds all bank-level characteristics γit constant including their time-varying component.
Bank-CBSA ηic are also held constant to capture factors related to banks’ location-specific
financial policy, including average market presence and unobserved preferences for investing in different local markets. The coefficients of interest µτ ’s quantify the average
difference in the likelihood of banks’ entry to local markets in Louisiana or Mississippi
compared to their likelihood of entry to local markets in the undamaged areas, relative to
an omitted category µ2004 normalized to be zero.
As shown in figure 2.5, the estimated coefficients µτ ’s demonstrate a positive shift in
the average likelihood of banks’ entry to disaster areas, compared to their likelihood of
entry to other markets. This flow of capital towards disaster areas coincided exactly with
the timing of the hurricane in 2005. Since the specification holds all bank time-varying
characteristics constant including total supply of mortgage lending, the estimated µτ ’s
17. I also use other continuous measures of bank lending volumes and obtain consistent results.
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indicates a relative substitution between markets within a bank’s yearly portfolio of originated loans. Considering the period of study 2001:2009, I report, in column (1) of table
2.3, a 4.25 percentage points average increase in the likelihood of a non-Southern bank
entering a local market in Louisiana or Mississippi in the post-Katrina period, relative to
the likelihood of the same bank entering undamaged local markets. Consistently, column
(2) point to a 31% average increase in the dollar amount of Non-Southern banks’ lending
in disaster markets compared to their lending in non-disaster markets. Together, estimates plotted in figure 2.5 and reported in table 2.3, provide evidence on disaster regions
in Louisiana and Mississippi attracting banks’ capital away from the rest of the country starting immediately after Katrina. This flow of capital is consistent with a relative
geographic substitution by banks towards disaster areas.
[Figure 2.5 and Table 2.3 about here]

2.4.2

Banks with Prior Geographic Footprint in Katrina-hit Areas

Second, to provide complementary evidence on the re-allocation hypothesis, I show
that banks’ having historic geographic footprint in Katrina areas, as defined by equation
2.2, reduced their supply of loans outside of disaster areas in the post-storm period. To
avoid potential confounding factors from the labor markets effects of the hurricane, I
focus on banks’ credit supply decisions in the CBSAs outside of the four storm-hit states,
as well as their four adjacent states.18 I use a three-dimensional panel [Bank-Year-CBSA]
to estimate the following specification:

CSict = α + ηic + ζct +

X

1[τ = t] × P Expi × µτ + ΓXit + ict

(2.7)

τ 6=2004

18. I remove all CBSAs that are fully or partially located in disaster states or their adjacent states. This
includes Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee and Texas.
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CSict is a measure of Bank’s i credit supply decision in CBSA c at year t. Since banks’
loan origination volumes are equilibrium outcomes of supply and demand, attributing
changes in origination volumes uniquely to supply side factors is challenging. I deal with
this concern as follows. As a credit supply measure, I follow Jiménez et al. (2012), Loutskina and Strahan (2009, 2011), and Antoniades (2016) and use bank i’s mortgage loan
approval rates at each local market at each year as a supply side measure. The intuition
of this approach is that, the approval or denial decision is made conditional on the loan
application being already submitted, which plausibly incorporate information about the
demand on credit facing each bank in each local market at each year. Second, CBSAyear fixed effects ζct account for all time-varying demand side shocks at the CBSA level.
Since banks might have different market strategy regarding different local markets, I include ηic denoting bank-CBSA fixed effects to capture factors driving the financial policy
of banks in each CBSA including the average physical market presence, branches and
banks’ unobserved preferences for investing in each local market. I also match banks
with their respective balance sheet data from the end-of-year Quarterly Report of Condition and Income (Call Reports). I use the Call Reports data to account for main financial
variables including total assets, core deposits to asset ratio, interest expenses to assets,
non-performing loans to assets, equity ratio, liquidity ratio, unused commitments & provisions for loan loss.19 I use the lagged version of these variables to form a bank-year
vector of lagged financial controls Xit . Similar to Gilje, Loutskina, and Strahan (2016) and
Antoniades (2016), I focus on bank lenders including national and state banks.20 P Expi
is the historic market presence (geographic footprint) of bank i in Katrina disaster areas measured using the HMDA loan-level data in year 2000 as defined in equation 2.2.

1[τ = t] are a set of indicator functions that equal one at their corresponding years and
zero otherwise.
19. All variables’ definitions are provided in the Appendix.
20. The sample at hand focuses on bank institutions given the availability of their balance sheet data
provided by the Call Reports. While currently having high weight in the mortgage market, HUD-regulated
mortgage companies have less stringent reporting requirements and less financial data available.
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The estimated coefficients µτ ’s quantify the average difference in loan approval rates
between banks having different historic market presence in Katrina areas, at each year,
relative to an omitted category µ2004 normalized to be zero. Based on the estimates
provided in Figure 2.6, I document an abrupt decline in banks’ loan approval rates, in
non-disaster areas, immediately after the storm. Considering the period of the study
2001:2009, estimates provided in column (1) of Table 2.4 quantify this decline in approval
rate to be, on average, 1.24 percentage points in the post period relative to prior to the
storm (the average bank had 4.8% P Expi ), consistent with a credit contraction in the undamaged areas that occurred simultaneously with increased capital flows towards disaster areas as shown in figure 2.5. The trend on the estimates µτ ’s point to a negligible and
constant effect of P Expi on the outcome of interest, loan approval rate, for an extended
period of time prior to Katrina.
[Figure 2.6 and Table 2.4 about here]
By being more geographically dispersed, larger banks are, on average, more likely
to have some market presence in Katrina areas. In fact, the summary statistics in Table
2.5 indicate that only a minority of 448 banks had, in 2000, some geographic footprint
in Katrina areas. However, this minority was responsible for more than two-thirds of
bank mortgage lending reported in HMDA.21 In addition to controlling for size, I conduct a sub-sample analysis based on the disaggregated computation of financial linkages
in equation 2.4 to show that national OCC-regulated banks had a stronger response to this
shock compared to state banks [Table 2.2]. Accordingly, I re-estimate specification 2.7 separately for the sets of national and state banks. The estimates reported in columns (2) and
(3) of Table 2.4 show a larger response for national banks and insignificant response for
the set of state banks, consistent with the fact that national banks are more geographically
dispersed compared to the more geographically compact activities of state banks.
21. This observation is consistent with Landier, Sraer, and Thesmar (2017) who attribute the increases in
house price correlation between states to large and regionally integrated banks operating in multiple states
and resulting in a synchronization of lending decisions between different regions.
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2.4.3

The Economic Trade-off driving Resource Re-allocation

Banks maximize their profits, by choosing among available projects, subject to some
resource constraints; a ‘winner-picking’ strategy as framed by Stein (1997). Informational
frictions impose constraints on banks’ ability to access capital markets and to pursue all
available investment opportunities simultaneously leading to the observed geographic
substitution in Figures 2.5 and 2.6.
Two points help rationalize banks’ substitution behavior: the existence of financial
constraints limiting banks’ access to external capital, and a relatively higher rate of return
for projects in disaster areas in the post-Katrina period compared to non-disaster areas.
Together, these two factors provide the economic rationale for banks’ observed substitution towards disaster areas and away from the undamaged regions. I, hereafter, provide
evidence supporting the validity of these two points:

Financial Constraints
I conduct sub-sample analyses to show that the banks that were seemingly less financially constrained were less involved in the observed geographic substitution following
the shock of Katrina. Liquidity shocks have weaker effect on credit supply decisions of
banks with ample deposit funding [Cornett et al. 2011 and Ivashina and Scharfstein 2010].
I stratify the sample around the median values of two measures of the availability of internal funding: banks’ core deposits to assets and banks’ equity ratios as proxies for banks’
financial constraints.22 I re-estimate specification 2.6 for the sets of constrained and unconstrained banks where constraints are proxied by these two measures of deposits and
equity. Using deposit funding availability, I show insignificant response of the sample of
unconstrained banks as opposed to a larger response for the constrained sample. The statistically significant difference between the point estimates for the two sub-samples pro22. Core deposits to assets are defined as (Total transaction accounts + Money Market Deposits Accounts
MMDA’s + Other Non-Transaction Savings Deposits (excluding MMDA’s)+ Total time deposits of less than
$100,000 - Total Brokered retail deposits issued in denominations of less than $100,000) / Total Assets
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vided in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.6 suggests that deposit funding alleviate banks’
financial constraints consistent with Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010). Regarding equity
ratio, I show, in columns (3) and (4), that banks with weaker equity funding had a more
pronounced re-allocation pattern than the higher equity sample. However, I fail to reject
the null hypothesis of the equality of the estimated responses. Accordingly, as opposed
to deposit funding, equity funding does not seem to totally alleviate financial constraints
in this context.
[Table 2.6 about here]
The results shown in Table 2.6 suggest that disaster markets were more preferred than
other markets for constrained banks in the post-disaster period. On the other hand, consistent with Chakraborty, Goldstein, and MacKinlay (2018), unconstrained institutions
are less responsive to local shocks.

Interest Rates Differential Between the Damaged and Undamaged Areas
Second, I document the emergence of a positive interest rate differential between
Katrina-damaged areas and the undamaged regions, immediately after the storm. This interest rate differential plausibly provided an incentive for the movement of funds within
banks’ ICMs towards reconstruction efforts and away from undamaged markets. In addition, this increase in the price of credit is also consistent with the positive aggregated
demand shock induced by reconstruction efforts as show in Figures 2.3 and 2.4. To test
this hypothesis, I collect yearly state-level interest rates on conventional single-family
mortgages provided by the interest rate survey of the FHFA. I provide supporting evidence on higher mortgage interest rates in Louisiana and Mississippi, compared to the
rest of the country, consistent with higher rates of return attracting capital towards disaster areas and away from the undamaged areas. To empirically document this statement,
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I estimate the following specification:

IRst = α + ηs + ζt + β1 × 1[Y ear > 2005] × Katrinas + st

(2.8)

IRst is the conventional single family mortgage rate at state s at year t. Katrinas is a
dummy variable that equals one for Louisiana and Mississippi and zero for other states.

1[Y ear > 2005] is an indicator function that equals one for the post-Katrina period and
zero otherwise. ηs denotes state fixed effects and ζt are year fixed effects. β1 quantifies the
average difference in mortgage rates between Louisiana and Mississippi and the rest of
the country.23
Consistent with the abnormal housing and mortgage activities observed in Katrinadamaged regions (Figures 2.3 and 2.4). I show, in table 2.7, that interest rates increased
in Louisiana and Mississippi in the post-Katrina period by 0.11 percentage points, on
average, relative to the undamaged states.
[Table 2.7 about here]

2.4.4

Securitization and Banks’ Financial Constraints

Were these constraints fully eased by the intervention of the Government-Sponsored
Enterprises GSEs or by securitization practices more generally? Securitization can weaken
the link between banks’ financial conditions and loan supply decisions [Loutskina and
Strahan 2009]. It can also alleviate the effect of local economic downturns on regionally
diversified banks’ credit supply [Loutskina 2011]. However, this excess lending in disaster areas was not fully absorbed by the GSEs or by non-agency securitization. First,
consistent with Chakraborty, Goldstein, and MacKinlay (2018), I show that significant
amounts of mortgage lending are retained on balance sheets. Specifically, about 39% of
23. Since the data is only provided at the state-year level, I consider disaster states to be only Louisiana
and Mississippi.

63

the volume of mortgage originations (dollar amounts) in local markets in Louisiana and
Mississippi during 2001-2009 correspond to portfolio lending,24 compared to a national
average of 33%.
[Table 2.8 about here]
Second, I use the information provided by HMDA data to compute banks’ retained
origination volumes in each local market. Using specification 2.6, I show an abnormal increase in the volume of lending originated in Louisiana and Mississippi and retained on
banks’ balance sheets starting immediately after the storm. Specifically, results in column
3 of table 2.3 point to a 20% increase in the average volume of banks’ funding originated
in disaster areas and retained on banks’ balance sheets after the storm relative to volumes
retained in non-disaster areas. This increase occurred immediately after the storm [Appendix Figure B.4]. Together, these two points suggest that disaster lending occupied an
increasing space on banks’ balance sheets starting 2005 and that securitization did not
fully alleviate the constraints arising from post-disaster lending.

2.4.5

The Role of Community Banks

Community banks’ networks don’t span a large number of local markets as they tend
to focus on building lending relationships in a small number of local markets. Consequently, they are less likely to have exposure or to respond to geographically distant
events such as Katrina. Due to their localized scope of banking activities, community
banks are not expected to re-allocate resources between geographically distant areas.
While there is no consensus on a clear-cut definition of community banking, a common approach is to use an asset size threshold [FDIC 2012]. I conduct a falsification
24. Since HMDA data only provides information on loan sales within the calendar year, this measure can
be downward biased. However, recent evidence provided by Adelino, Gerardi, and Hartman-Glaser (2019)
suggests that this bias is limited. The vast majority of loans securitized are sold shortly after origination.
Specifically, more than 92% of GSE loans and more than 78% of privately securitized loans are sold within
two months of origination.
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test by restricting the analysis to banks with less than $BN 1 of assets.25 Accordingly, I
re-estimate specification 2.6 for smaller-scale community-oriented banks. The results indicate insignificant response to the shock of Katrina for small and geographically limited
banks headquartered outside of the South.
[Table 2.9 about here]

2.5

Link 3: The Impact of Financial linkages Housing and
Credit Markets

The previous findings document credit supply contractions by financially constrained
multi-market banks in the undamaged regions in the U.S., driven by their re-allocation
of resources towards reconstruction activities in disaster areas. The last hypothesis tested
by this paper is that, the undamaged regions witnessed a decline in housing prices in
the post-Katrina period, in recognition of this credit supply disruption. An exogenous
variation between the undamaged areas emanates from the heterogeneity in their financial linkages to Katrina-hit areas, since banks’ optimization was driven by reconstruction
activities in the damaged areas and was plausibly unrelated to housing market fundamentals, including demand factors, in the distant undamaged markets. To the extent that
credit supply influence housing markets, housing prices in the areas with strong financial
ties to Katrina-hit markets were more responsive to this credit disruption.
I start by exploiting within-state heterogeneity in CBSAs’ financial linkages to disaster regions as defined in equation 2.3. This measure of financial linkages quantifies the
extent to which an undamaged CBSA or county is connected, through common financial
institutions, to Katrina areas. Accordingly, a region having a high market share of banks
25. In addition to small asset size, community banks are also characterized by focusing on the provision
of traditional banking services to their local communities, working on limited number of local markets &
by their reliance on relationship lending & hands-on experience in their local markets [FDIC 2012]. See the
FDIC Community Banking Study (2012) for a comprehensive discussion on community banks and their
role within their local economies. https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/cbi/report/cbi-full.pdf.
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linked to Katrina areas is highly financially linked to Katrina regions. Areas primarily
served by banks with little or no ties with to disaster areas would be marginally linked to
Katrina regions.
I compare HPI trends for CBSAs with different strength of financial linkages to disaster areas, within their respective states. Similar to the previous analyses, I drop the
CBSAs located in the four states that were impacted or partially impacted by Katrina and
the ones located in the four adjacent states including Arkansas, Georgia, Tennessee and
Texas.26 Since this research design relies on a within-state comparison, I also drop CBSAs
that lie within two or more states. Finally, I focus on the CBSAs for which I can retrieve
labor market data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The sample at hand contains 220
CBSAs in 36 states.27 The average state in the sample contains 6.1 CBSAs.28

2.5.1

Graphical Analysis

To study the evolution of HPI trends around the timing of Katrina, I compute the
distribution of CBSAs’ financial linkages to Katrina regions within each state. Hence, I
identify the least and most connected quartiles of CBSAs within their respective states.
Accordingly, within each state, the least and most financially connected CBSAs serve as
treatment and control for each other. A within-state comparison holds all state-wide policies and demand shocks constant. Figure 2.1 shows the evolution of housing price trends
of the least and most connected quartiles of CBSAs around the timing of Katrina. The
trends of the treatment and control groups support the following observations. First, I
do not observe any differential trend between the treatment and control groups of CBSAs prior to the exact timing of the storm (late August 2005). For an extended period
26. In all prices and quantity analyses, I drop these eight states to lessen potential concerns about confounding factors related to local labor markets’ impacts of the hurricane.
27. Some states are excluded at they don’t contain more than one CBSA to conduct a within state comprison. These states are Connecticut, the District of Columbia, New Hampshire, Maine, Massachusetts and
Vermont.
28. A list of all CBSAs included in the analysis is provided in the Appendix.
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of time before Katrina, trends remained superimposed. Second, the divergence of trends
occurred exactly after Katrina in the fourth quarter of 2005. Third, the post-Katrina gap
in housing prices between the connected and the less connected CBSAs didn’t dissipate
swiftly. Actually, the gap stopped widening in early 2007 and remained stable afterwards.
Finally, this pattern corresponds to the time pattern of banks’ credit supply substitution
towards the disaster markets shown in Figures 2.5 and 2.6 and the reconstruction process
in the damaged regions shown in Figures 2.3 and 2.4.

2.5.2

Specification

To formally identify the exact timing of the divergence observed in figure 2.1, I estimate the following event study specification:
X

ln(HP Iist ) − ln(HP Iist−1 ) = α + ηis + ζst +

1[τ = t] × Linkis × µτ + Xist Γ + ist

τ 6=2004:Q4

(2.9)
HP Iist is the FHFA’s house price index of CBSA i in state s at quarter t. The outcome
of interest is the first difference of the natural logarithm of HPIs, equivalent to housing
prices quarterly growth in each CBSA i at state s at quarter t. This specification accounts
for CBSAs’ specific levels of home values by first-differencing and for heterogeneous CBSAs’ HPI specific trends by accounting for CBSA fixed effects ηis . I follow Favara and
Imbs (2015) and focus on HPI growth rates for two reasons. First, a housing price index
cannot be used to compare price levels across cities, but it can be used to calculate growth
rates and to compare prices over time [Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai 2005]. Taking the
first difference addresses this concern by controlling for all time-invariant characteristics
of different local markets. Second, housing prices in the United States display heterogeneous trends [Favara and Imbs 2015]. Accounting for CBSA fixed effects ηis controls for
CBSA-specific trends in housing price growth. Linkis is the measure of financial linkages
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of the CBSA to Katrina-affected regions as computed using equation 2.3. Xist are some
time-varying CBSA-level controls. 1[τ = t] are a set of indicator functions that equal one
at their corresponding quarters and zero otherwise. Accounting for state-quarters fixed
effects ζst reflects the intuition of the quasi-experiment at hand by using CBSAs, with financial linkages of different strength to Katrina areas, within the same state as treatment
and controls for each other. The coefficients of interest are the pattern on the µτ ’s that capture the impact of financial connectedness to Katrina areas at each point of time, relative
to an omitted category prior to the hurricane.29

2.5.3

Results

I present the first set of results in Table 2.10. The estimated coefficients show a set of
statistically and economically insignificant µτ ’s prior to the exact timing of Katrina, consistent with the observed parallel trends in Figure 2.1. For an extended period of time
before 2005: Q4, financial connectedness to Katrina areas didn’t imply meaningful differences in HPI growth between local markets. Immediately after Katrina, the coefficient
µ2005:Q4 points to a one-off negative shock to HPI growth in the CBSAs having strong financial ties to disaster areas, relative to the ones with weak linkages. This transient shock
to HPI growth led to a persistent gap in price levels as shown in figure 2.1, with several
post-Katrina coefficients being insignificant.
[Table 2.10 about here]
The main coefficient of interest is µ2005:Q4 . This coefficient estimates the average difference in HPI growth between the CBSAs of different strength of financial linkages, in
the quarter immediately following the storm. A coefficient of -0.287 points to lower housing price growth rates, on average by 28.7 percentage points, between CBSAs having a
difference of one in the strength of their financial linkages to Katrina areas. Hence, for the
29. The omitted category is set as µ2004:Q4 , one year prior to the storm. Same pattern holds for other
choices.
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CBSA with the average financial connectedness to Katrina-affected areas (0.025 as shown
in Table 2.11) , the decline in HPI in the fourth quarter of 2005 is 0.71 percentage points.
This negative one-off shock to growth rates translated to persistently lower levels of HPI.

2.6

Addressing potential unobserved heterogeneity between
local markets

The identifying assumption in the CBSA-level analysis is that, in the absence of the
credit supply disruption induced by Katrina, housing prices would have continued to
trend similarly in the connected and less connected CBSAs. Unconfoundedness requires
no unobserved factors to be simultaneously associated with both the treatment and the
outcome of interest [Imbens and Wooldridge 2009], home values in this case, conditional
on the observed covariates and on the CBSAs being in the same state. While the parallel
pre-Katrina trends support the credibility of this assumption, unconfoundedness is not
directly testable. However, I observe that the more connected CBSAs have, on average,
larger populations [Table 2.11], consistent with larger markets being more financially integrated in the financial system. I address this challenge using the following series of
tests:

2.6.1

Credit Market Tightening in the Undamaged Regions

Using a sample of yearly data on conventional single family mortgage interest rates
in eighteen large metropolitan areas outside of disaster areas and their adjacent states, I
provide corroborating evidence on a credit market tightening in the areas with strong financial ties to disaster regions, immediately after Katrina. Specifically, metropolitan areas
with strong linkages to Katrina markets witnessed an increase in interest rate compared
compared to the weakly linked MSAs, immediately after the storm. This tightening oc-
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curred simultaneously with the observed decline in home values observed in figure 2.1
and supports the hypothesis of a credit-induced decline in home values in the undamaged regions.30

2.6.2

County-Level Analysis

The second test aims at alleviating the concerns about potential unobserved heterogeneity between CBSAs within the same state, using a more granular level of analysis at
the county level. I compare the evolution of housing prices of different counties, having
different financial linkages to disaster areas, within the same CBSA around the timing
of Katrina. This approach accounts for CBSA-time fixed effects and measures the effect
of varying financial linkages to Katrina areas between different counties within the same
CBSA. Similar to the CBSA-level analysis, I drop all counties located in the states that
were partially or fully impacted by the hurricane and their four adjacent states.31
Table 2.12 provides summary statistics of a large series of labor, housing and mortgage
markets characteristics averaged during the five pre-Katrina period [2000:2004] for all
urban counties outside of Katrina areas and their adjacent states. Summary statistics are
presented, in two categories, based on the strength of counties’ financial connectedness
to Katrina areas. The two subgroups of counties, the highly and weakly linked to Katrina
areas, seem to have generally similar average characteristics, including relatively similar
labor force and housing market sizes.
[Table 2.12 about here]
30. In the online Appendix, I describe this test in greater detail
31. Similar to the CBSA-level analysis, local markets in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Tennessee and Texas are dropped from this analysis.
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Accordingly, I form a county-year-level panel using the FHFA county-level HPI index
to estimate the following difference-in-difference model:32
ln(HP Iict ) − ln(HP Iict−1 ) = β0 + β1 × 1[Y ear > 2005] × Linkic + Xict α + ηic + ζct + ict
(2.10)
where HP Iict is the house price index of county i located in CBSA c at year t. The
outcome of interest is housing prices’ yearly growth in county i in CBSA c at year t. Linkic
is the measure of financial connectedness to Katrina areas computed by equation 2.3 for
all counties, using the year 2000’s HMDA cross-section. ζct are CBSA-year fixed effects
that capture all CBSA-wide time-varying demand shocks and policy changes. Xict are
some time-varying county-level controls. 1[Y ear > 2005] is an indicator function that
equals one for the post-Katrina period and zero otherwise. Similar to the CBSA-level
analysis, this specification accounts for counties’ specific levels of HPI by first differencing
and for heterogeneous counties’ specific trends by accounting for county fixed effects ηic .
The coefficient of interest β1 quantifies the effect of counties’ financial linkages to disaster areas after Katrina relative to the pre-storm period, conditional on counties being in
the same CBSA. β1 , reported in Column (1) of table 2.13, indicates that a unit increase in
financial linkages to Katrina-impacted areas resulted in a 36.9 percent decline in housing
prices after the storm. Accordingly, the county with the average strength of financial linkages to Katrina-hit areas (0.026 as shown in Table 2.2), witnessed a decline of 0.96 percent
in housing prices in the post-storm period.
[Table 2.13 about here]
32. Unlike the quarterly CBSA-level index, the FHFA only provides annual HPI indices for counties.
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2.6.3

Timing of the effect and parallel trends (County Level)

To precisely identify the timing of the divergence of trends between the financially
linked and less financially linked counties, I compare house prices in different counties
within the same CBSA at each point of time using the following diff-in-diff event study
specification:

∆HP Iict = α + ζct +

X

I[τ = t] × Linkic × µτ + ict

(2.11)

τ 6=2004

I[τ = t] is a set of indicator functions that equal one at their corresponding years
and zero otherwise. ζct sets the comparison between counties located in the same CBSA.
The coefficients of interest are the pattern on the µτ ’s that capture the difference in the
change in housing prices between the financially connected and less financially connected
counties, relative to the omitted category µ2004 .33
The µτ ’s estimates, shown in Figure 2.7, indicate that home values in the financially
linked counties started declining exactly at the hurricane year, in 2005, compared to the
less financially linked and that the gap significantly increased in 2006, consistent with
Katrina’s timing in late August 2005. Constant and insignificant estimates of µτ ’s prior to
the storm suggest that financial linkages didn’t imply meaningful differences in housing
prices in the prior to the storm. Similar to the CBSA-level analysis, the parallel pre-storm
trends lend support to the unconfoundedness assumption.
[Figure 2.7 about here]

2.6.4

Local Banks as Housing Market Stabilizers

I examine the hypothesis that a higher market share of small banks dampened the
effect of financial linkages to disaster areas on local housing prices in the undamaged
33. I also show the same divergence between prices levels in different counties based on their financial
connectedness to disaster areas.
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counties. Local banks, outside of the impacted areas, have little financial ties to Katrina
markets. By being unexposed to disaster areas, they are expected to insulate their local
markets from the external credit shock induced by the storm. I define local banks as the
set of lenders reporting the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as their main
regulating agency.34 This definition is based on their geographically compact network of
operations and their little contribution to financial linkages between Katrina areas and
the undamaged regions as computed in Table 2.2. I estimate specification 2.10 with an
additional interaction term including the pre-Katrina share of small scale banks in county
i as follows:
ln(HP Iict ) − ln(HP Iict−1 ) = α + ηic + ζct + β1 × 1[Y ear > 2005] × Linkics
+β2 × 1[Y ear > 2005] × Linkics × Share Smallic + Xicst Γ + ict

(2.12)

Where Share Smallic is the aggregate market share of banks reporting the FDIC as
their main regulator computed in 2004 in county i. I show, in column (2) of table 2.13, that
a higher share of local banks dampens the negative effect of the credit shock on housing
price growth.35 Specifically, a 0.01 increase in the fraction of the local market held by
local banks reduces the negative effect of the credit shock on local housing prices by 0.01
percentage points.

2.6.5

Triple Difference and Housing Supply Elasticity

The effect of financial linkages on housing prices in the undamaged regions worked
through a credit contraction by banks that re-allocated resources towards disaster areas
after Katrina. Similar to Mian and Sufi (2018), credit contractions negatively influence
household demand on housing. The magnitude of the effect on local housing prices de34. State-chartered lenders can be regulated by the Federal Reserve (if members of the FRS) or by the FDIC
or by their chartering state. Lenders reporting the FDIC as their regulator have on average much smaller
asset size. They work on a limited number of counties and have very little contribution to financial linkages
[Table 2.2]
35. The average market share of banks that report the FDIC as their main regulator is about 12-13%.
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pends on the elasticity of housing supply. I graphically illustrate the joint equilibrium in
the mortgage and housing markets using the following diagram. In the undamaged regions, the Katrina-induced shock led to a mortgage credit tightening, orthogonal to local
demand. This tightening shifted the credit supply curve leftward, leading to lower credit
availability and higher equilibrium interest rates in undamaged areas. This contraction
negatively impacted consumers’ demand on housing, leading to a decline in housing
prices as shown in figure 2.1. A decline in residential development is expected and illustrated on the graph as ∆Housing. This translates to a wedge between supply and
demand in housing markets with a lower price to sellers P rice Sellers. The mix of price
and quantity adjustments to this credit shock depends on the elasticity of housing supply.
Large price declines are expected in inelastic markets. Elastic housing markets weather
the shock through quantity adjustments along with price responses. This heterogeneity
in expected responses provides an additional layer of heterogeneity to difference-out potential unobserved factors, by having subgroups of different responsiveness to the shock
within the treatment and control groups of counties.
Topological factors impose barriers on construction, and are commonly used as proxies for housing supply elasticity. Land unavailability measures were introduced to proxy
for housing supply restrictions. The rationale behind them is that, natural factors, including steep slopes, water bodies and wetlands, make construction costly and positively
predict home values [Saiz 2010]. Such measures were used as instruments for home values by Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2012), Mian and Sufi (2014) and Chetty, Sándor, and
Szeidl (2017). I use a granular county-level measure computed by Lutz and Sand (2017),
based on satellite imagery, of the percentage of land unavailable for development due
to steep slopes, water bodies and wetlands.36 Accordingly, I employ the following triple
36. Measures provided by Saiz (2010) are at the Metropolitan Statistical Area level. I use Lutz and Sand
(2017)’s measures given their suitability to the county-year level triple difference framework conducted in
this section.
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Joint Equilibrium in Local Mortgage and Housing Markets
Interest Rate
T he M ortgage M arket

A M ortgage Credit Supply T ightening
S2
S1

Credit Demand
Lending

T he Housing M arket
Housing Prices

A Housing Demand Contraction

HSE
P rice Buyers
P rice Sellers

Housing Demand

S
∆Housing

Housing Quantity: Construction (Building Permits)

A Credit-Induced Housing Demand Contraction: The diagram illustrates the joint equilibrium in the mortgage and housing markets. The upper figure illustrates the partial
equilibrium in the mortgage market. The lower figure is the equilibrium in the housing
market. Credit tightening acts as a tax driving a wedge between housing supply and demand leading to lower prices to sellers P rice Sellers and a lower quantities of housing
supplied. The size of the effect depends on housing supply elasticity HSE.
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difference specification to leverage this third layer of variation:
Yict = α + β1 × 1[Y ear > 2005] × HSEic + β2 × 1[Y ear > 2005] × Linkic
+β3 × 1[Y ear > 2005] × Linkic × HSEic + Xict Γ + ηic + ζct + ict
(2.13)
Yict denotes housing price growth in county i located in CBSA c at year t. Xict are some
time-varying county-level controls. Linkic is the measure of financial linkages of county
i to Katrina areas. HSEic is computed using land unavailability measures provided by
Lutz and Sand (2017) for county i located in CBSA c.37 1[Year>2005] is an indicator function equaling one for the post-Katrina period and zero otherwise. ζct are CBSA-year fixed
effects capturing CBSA-wide time-varying demand shocks and policy changes and ηic denotes county fixed effects. The triple difference estimator nets-out potential unobserved
factors that might be confounded with financial linkages to disaster areas. The causal
effects are estimated by both β2 and β3 ,38 where β2 is the average differential change in
the outcome of interest after and before Katrina for the highly inelastic housing markets
(HSEic =0 or no land available).
β2 = (E[Yit |Inelastic, Linked, P ost] − E[Yit |Inelastic, Linked, P re])

(2.14)

−(E[Yit |Inelastic, U nlinked, P ost] − E[Yit |Inelastic, U nlinked, P re])
37. Similar to Favara and Imbs (2015), I compute HSEic as the inverse of the land unavailability measure.
38. For simplicity of the notation, I assume Linkedic and HSEic to be binary treatments: Exposed versus
Unexposed and Elastic versus Inelastic in Post versus Pre-Katrina period
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β3 is the difference in the causal effect for the counties with high elasticity of housing
supply relative to the ones with low elasticity.
β +β +β

3
z
}|2 1
{
β3 = (E[Yit |Elastic, Linked, P ost] − E[Yit |Elastic, Linked, P re])

β

}|2
{
z
− (E[Yit |Inelastic, Linked, P ost] − E[Yit |Inelastic, Linked, P re])
β1

(2.15)

z
}|
{
− (E[Yit |Elastic, U nlinked, P ost] − E[Yit |Elastic, U nlinked, P re])
0

z
}|
{
− (E[Yit |Inelastic, U nlinked, P ost] − E[Yit |Inelastic, U nlinked, P re])
Since inelastic local housing markets are expected to witness the highest depreciation
in home values, β2 is negative and β3 is positive, indicating that supply elasticity dampens
the negative effect of the shock on housing prices. Based on the estimates of β2 and β3
provided in column (3) of table 2.13, I compute the average treatment effect as follows:
AT E = (βˆ2 + βˆ3 × HSEic ) × Linkic = (−0.408 + 0.372 × 0.1336) × .0248 ≈ −0.89% (2.16)

Accordingly, I report a decline in housing prices of %0.89 relative to pre-storm prices
for the county with the average financial linkages to disaster areas and average housing
supply elasticity; a very similar estimate to the one obtained using the previous diff-indiff analysis in specification 2.10.

2.6.6

The response in terms of housing quantities

To document the quantity response of local housing markets, I compile data from the
Building Permits Survey (BPS) maintained by the US Census Bureau. The BPS aggregates,
at the county-year level, data from individual permits forms (Form C-404) and provides
information on the number of buildings and housing units authorized and the monetary
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valuation of the construction. Using this data, I estimate the following specification:
∆Qict = α + β1 × 1[Y ear > 2005] × HSEic + β2 × 1[Y ear > 2005] × Linkic
+β3 × 1[Y ear > 2005] × Linkic × HSEic + Xict Γ + ζct + ict

(2.17)

Q is the number of annually issued building permits corresponding to housing units
or residential buildings or the monetary valuation of the structures aggregated at the
county-year level.39 β2 is the effect for highly inelastic markets, β3 is the additional effect
for counties with some positive HSEic and the Average Treatment Effect ATE is given
by: AT E = (β2 + β3 × HSEic ) × Linkic . Table 2.14 shows that β2 is insignificant for the
three measures of quantities suggesting insignificant quantity response in highly inelastic
areas. β3 is negative, economically and statistically significant for the three measures. The
estimate of β3 indicates a post-hurricane decline in the total yearly valuation of construction activities of Mn $ 7.93 corresponding to forgone projects related to 47.9 housing units
and a 30.92 buildings in the county with the average housing supply elasticity and the
average financial linkages to Katrina-hit areas. Accordingly, an average of approximately
4.2% of the annual number of housing units supplied at county markets was forgone due
to the credit disruption caused by Katrina.
[Table 2.14 about here]

2.7

Conclusions

Economic conditions in a local market influence banks’ lending decisions in other areas, and in turn, disrupt housing markets in these areas, by drawing resources away from
them. Regarding Katrina, two factors were at the origin of this disruption: fiscal policies
that boosted demand for reconstruction in disaster areas and financial constraints that
39. Buildings could correspond to single family or multi-family building (and thus including multiple
units)
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required banks to pick the most profitable projects, leading to a resource re-allocation
towards disaster areas and away from the undamaged ones.
I documented three plausibly linked hypotheses forming a coherent causal chain of
events. First, I provided evidence on a long-term housing and mortgage boom that
emerged in storm-damaged areas immediately after Katrina. Second, responding to this
abnormal demand led financially constrained multi-market banks to re-allocate resources
towards disaster areas, at the expense of distant undamaged regions. Third, this reallocation led to a credit tightening, a decline in housing prices and construction in the
undamaged areas, starting immediately after Katrina. Local housing markets varied in
their response to the shock based on the slope of the housing supply curve. Elastic markets weathered the shock through a mix of housing price and quantity adjustments. Inelastic markets responded primarily with price declines. The average treatment effects
points to a 0.89% decline in home values. The estimated quantity response points to 31
buildings or 48 housing units’ projects forgone due to the Katrina-related credit shock in
the county with the average supply elasticity and average strength of financial linkages
to Katrina regions.
Three policy and banking strategy issues are highlighted. First, local funding shocks
propagate, through banks’ internal capital markets, consistent with Gilje, Loutskina, and
Strahan (2016), Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012), Peek and Rosengren (1997) and Hale, Kapan, and Minoiu (2020). Consequently, policies aiming to support some regional housing
markets, such as disaster aid, can disrupt housing markets in other regions. Second, by
being unexposed to the shock of Katrina, and due to their localized lending activities, local lenders partially shielded their local markets from this external shock. This result
highlights the stabilizing role of community banks for local housing markets, specifically vis-à-vis external shocks. Third, reconstruction efforts in the aftermath of natural
disasters provide profitable opportunities for banks. Banks strategically and swiftly reallocated part of their business to disaster areas.
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These results have implications beyond the scope of the analysis of the event of Katrina. Local funding shocks could result from a variety of sources including extreme
weather events, the development of natural resources or other regional economic fluctuations. This paper adds to the literature on internal capital markets by exploring a new
source of funding shocks, that is environmental shocks. Consistent with Gilje, Loutskina,
and Strahan (2016), these results also confirm the limitations of securitization in alleviating banks’ financial constraints. Consequently, location-specific risks still matter in banks’
geographic resource allocation decisions. Most importantly, this paper took a step further
by documenting significant real market impacts of these spillovers.
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2.8

Tables and Figures

Table 2.1: Lenders’ Size and Regional Diversification
for different categories of geographic footprint in Katrina regions

All Lenders

Obs.

Mean

Std. Dev. Median

Geographic footprint
Total Lending of Institution ($1000)
Number of Counties per institution
Number of CBSAs per institution

7458 0.048
0.195
7427 163426.8 1503402
7458 67.52
280.2
7459 29.56
107.32

0
10104
9
5

6069 31160.54
6100 15.91
6086
8.01

8129
8
4

Lenders with No Geographic footprint
in Katrina Areas
Total Lending of Institution ($1000)
Number of Counties per institution
Number of CBSAs per institution

108868
38.62
18.04

Lenders with some Geographic footprint
in Katrina Areas
Geographic footprint
Total Lending of Institution ($1000)
Number of Counties per institution
Number of CBSAs per institution

1358 0.266
0.39
0.032
1358 754534.4 3447873 44046.5
1358 299.32
599.15
42
1359 126.25
224.4
21

Note: This table reports summary statistics of financial institutions’ historic market presence (Geographic footprint) in Katrina-hit areas computed using the 2000’s cross section of HMDA data.
The sample is divided based on portfolio exposure to Katrina areas. Other lender-related characteristics are total mortgage lending, in addition to two measure of geographic diversification
including the number of CBSAs and counties in which a lender operates.
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Table 2.2: Undamaged Local Markets’ (Counties) Financial linkages to Katrina areas,
de-composed & ordered by the type of institutions contributing to financial ties.
National Banks & Mortgage Companies have the most contribution to financial
inter-linkages.
Financial linkages to Katrina Areas
Total
Through OCC Banks
Through HUD Lenders
Through Thrifts
Through FRS Banks
Through FDIC Banks
Through Credit Unions

Ranking
1
2
3
4
5
6

Mean
.026
.01
.007
.004
.003
.001
.0001

Std. Dev.
.01
.009
.003
.003
.002
.002
.0002

Note: This table reports summary statistics of undamaged counties’ financial linkages to
Katrina-hit areas computed, by equation 2.3, using HMDA data for year 2000. Financial linkages
are disaggregated to linkages through different types of financial institutions including national
banks, FRS-regulated state banks, FDIC-regulated state banks, Thrifts, Credit Unions and HUDregulated mortgage companies. Financial institutions are ranked based on their contributions to
geographic financial ties. The most geographically diversified and dispersed lenders, including
OCC-regulated banks and HUD-regulated mortgage companies, have the highest contribution to
financial linkages between local markets. State banks non-members of the FRS & credit unions
make much smaller contributions to these linkages with their more localized lending activities.
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Table 2.3: Post-Katrina Banks’ Capital Flow Towards Disaster Areas

(1)
(2)
(3)
Market Entry Decision Total Lending Retained Lending
1[Year>2005] ×1[Disaster Area]

Bank-CBSA FE
Bank-Year FE
Bank-Year groups
Bank-CBSA groups
Number of Banks
Number of CBSAs
Bank-Year-CBSA Observations
R-squared

0.0425***
(0.0126)

0.312***
(0.0370)

X
X
X
X
20592
20592
84792
84792
3661
3661
929
929
356,047
356,047
0.636
0.863
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0.202***
(0.0383)
X
X
20592
84792
3661
929
356,047
0.851

Note: This table reports the coefficient estimates for the simple diff-in-diff version of specification 2.6. The period of study is 2001:2009. Outcome variables include the market entry decision (originating at least one loan) of a given bank at a given year in a given CBSA, the natural
logarithm of Bank’s i lending amount at CBSA c at year t (log (Lending +10k)) and the natural
logarithm of Bank’s i retained lending amount at CBSA c at year t (log (Lending +10k)). After
Katrina, the estimates indicate an increased likelihood of banks’ market entry to Katrina-hit markets in Louisiana and Mississippi compared to entry to other markets in the U.S. (Column (1)),
an increase in banks’ lending volumes (Column (2)) and an increase in lending originated and
retained in disaster areas (Column (3)), consistent with a significant flow of capital towards disaster areas and away from the undamaged areas as shown in figure 2.5. All banks considered are
headquartered outside of the U.S. South (using the Census Bureau definition of the 17 Southern
States). Standard Errors are clustered at the CBSA level.
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Table 2.4: Decline in Loan Approval Rates, immediately after the hurricane, in the
Undamaged Regions for Banks’ with historic market Presence (Geographic Footprint)
in Katrina-affected regions

Bank’s Loan Approval Rate

1[Year>2005] ×Bank 0 s Historic Katrina P resence

(1)
All Banks

(2)
National Banks

(3)
State Banks

-0.259*
(0.156)

-0.346**
(0.165)

-0.0239
(0.0668)

X
X
X
23953
643
684
110,120
0.594

X
X
X
25029
1992
689
111,814
0.581

Banks’ Balance Sheet Controls
X
Bank-CBSA FE
X
CBSA-Year FE
X
Bank-CBSA groups
49001
Number of Banks
2633
Number of CBSAs
690
Bank-Year-CBSA Observations
222,067
R-squared
0.582
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: This table reports the coefficient estimates for specification 2.7. The dependent variable
is the bank loan approval rate in each CBSA at each point of time in each of the undamaged areas (CBSAs located in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee &
Texas are dropped from the sample). The explanatory variable is an interaction of post-Katrina
period and banks’ historic market presence (Geographic footprint) in Katrina-hit areas. The exposure measure is computed, as defined in equation 2.2 using the HMDA cross-section for year
2000. Balance sheet controls include lagged versions of the natural logarithm of total assets, core
deposits to asset size, interest expenses to assets, non-performing loans to assets, equity ratio, liquidity ratio, unused commitments & provisions for loan loss to assets. Column (1) provides the
results for the whole sample. Column (2) provides the results for national banks while (3) provides the results for state banks. Trends are superimposed for an extended period of time prior to
the hurricane. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level.
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Table 2.5: Summary Statistics of Banks’ Financial Characteristics stratified based on
their Historic Market Presence in Katrina Areas

Katrina Footprint=0
Mean
Balance Sheet Variables
Log assets
Core deposits / assets
Interest expenses / assets
Non-performing loans / assets
Equity ratio
Liquidity ratio
Unused commitments / assets
Provisions for loan loss / assets
Number of Banks
All Originations by each set in 2000

12.062
0.702
0.034
0.005
0.048
0.312
0.147
0.002

St. Dev.

1.095
0.112
0.007
0.007
0.035
0.131
1.679
0.005
2,898
70.2 BN

Katrina Footprint>0
Mean St. Dev.
13.18
0.645
0.036
0.006
0.047
0.295
0.176
0.004

1.923
0.134
0.008
0.007
0.041
0.136
0.377
0.009
448
139 BN

Note: This table reports summary statistics of different banks’ financial variables. Balance sheet
variables are extracted from the year-end call report at the start of the period of the study in 2000.
The sample is stratified into two categories based on whether banks had some historic geographic
footprint in disaster areas.
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Table 2.6: Weaker or Insignificant Estimated Responses
for Financially Unconstrained Sub-samples of banks

Market Entry Decision
Sample Stratified by:

Core Deposits to Assets

Equity Ratio

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(Constrained) (Unconstrained) (Constrained) (Unconstrained)
1[Year>2005] ×1[Disaster Area]

H0 : (βC onstrained = βU nconstrained )
Bank-Year FE
Bank-CBSA FE
Bank-Year-CBSA Observations
Bank-Year Clusters
Bank-CBSA Cluster
R-squared

0.0606***
(0.0135)

-0.0158
(0.0196)

Reject (zscore = 3.21)
X
X
168,490
4082
44019
0.653

0.0515***
(0.0177)

0.0267**
(0.0129)

Fail to Reject (zscore = 1.13)

X
X
X
X
170,207
166,207
15788
9618
47400
46832
0.658
0.679
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

X
X
165,030
9804
46599
0.636

Note: This table reports the coefficients’ estimates of specification 2.6 for the set of financially
unconstrained banks (High deposit funding & highly equity ratio) and constrained banks stratified around the median values in the sample. Hypothesis testing rejects the Null hypothesis of
similar responses between banks with high deposit funding compared to the ones with low deposit funding. On the other hand, it fails to reject the Null hypothesis for banks with high equity
ratio compared to the ones with low equity ratio. Standard errors are clustered at the CBSA level.
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Table 2.7: Increase in Interest Rates in Disaster Areas in the Post-Hurricane Period

Mortgage Rates (pct. pts.)
1[Year>2005] ×1[Louisiana or M ississippi]

0.108***
(0.0398)

Year FE
X
State FE
X
State-Year Observations
459
Number of States
51
R-squared
0.980
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The estimate presented at this table quantifies the average contract interest rate difference between Louisiana and Mississippi, and the rest of the country after the storm compared to
before the storm. The period of study is 2001:2009. The dependent variable is an average stateyear level single family conventional mortgage contract interest rate provided by the FHFA survey
of interest rates. The estimate points to a 0.108 percentage points increase in interest rates in disaster areas (Louisiana & Mississippi) in the post-Katrina period compared to the undamaged areas,
consistent with a housing and mortgage boom in these areas, after the storm. Standard errors are
clustered at the state level.

87

Table 2.8: Loan Retention, Loan Sales to GSEs and Non-Agency Securitization

Retained
Category

GSEs

PLS (Non-Agency)

Mean Median Std. dev. Mean Median Std. dev. Mean Median Std. dev.

LA & MS
39.2% 38.6%
National Average 32.1% 31%

9.3%
10.3%

23.9% 23.1%
28.9% 27.3%

7.9%
10.8%

32.2% 32.4%
34.6% 34.4%

9.9%
11.4%

Note: This table provides an overview of the percentage of originated funds retained, sold to
GSEs or privately securitized over the period of the study 2001-2009 in local markets (CBSAs) in
Louisiana and Mississippi and in all CBSAs in the United States. The Non-Agency loans category
includes loans sales labelled in HMDA data as: Private securitization, Loan sold to Commercial
bank, savings bank or savings association, Life insurance company, credit union, mortgage bank,
or finance company, Affiliate institution or Other type of purchaser.
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Table 2.9: Insignificant Response for Community Banks

Market Entry Decision
1[Year>2005] ×1[Disaster Area]

-0.0175
(0.0233)

Bank-CBSA FE
X
Bank-Year FE
X
Bank-CBSA-Year Observations
127,523
R-squared
0.652
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This table reports the coefficient estimate for the simple diff-in-diff version of specification 2.6 restricted to the set of banks with less than $ 1 BN of assets. The period of study is
2001:2009. The dependent variable is the market entry decision (originating at least one loan) of
a given bank at a given year in a given CBSA. All banks considered are headquartered outside of
the U.S. South. Standard Errors are clustered at the CBSA level.
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Table 2.10: The Impact of Financial Inter-linkages on Housing Prices (Different
CBSAs in the same State) and the Divergence of Trends exactly after the storm
HPI Quarterly Growth
µτ
SE.

Coefficient on 1[τ = t] × Linkis
µ2001 : Q1
0.106
(0.121)
µ2001 : Q2
-0.00888
(0.113)
µ2001 : Q3
-0.173
(0.122)
µ2001 : Q4
0.164
(0.111)
µ2002 : Q1
-0.0255
(0.125)
µ2002 : Q2
-0.0428
(0.103)
µ2002 : Q3
0.0275
(0.118)
µ2002 : Q4
0.0623
(0.108)
µ2003 : Q1
-0.0805
(0.0990)
µ2003 : Q2
-0.0218
(0.104)
µ2003 : Q3
0.118
(0.100)
µ2003 : Q4
-0.137
(0.102)
µ2004 : Q1
0.0298
(0.135)
µ2004 : Q2
0.00187
(0.143)
µ2004 : Q3
-0.0935
(0.136)
Omitted Category µ2004Q4
0
0
µ2005 : Q1
-0.149
(0.131)
µ2005 : Q2
0.00226
(0.162)
µ2005 : Q3
0.0833
(0.150)
µ2005 : Q4
-0.287***
(0.0903)
µ2006 : Q1
0.0538
(0.162)
µ2006 : Q2
-0.0756
(0.123)
µ2006 : Q3
-0.0952
(0.123)
µ2006 : Q4
0.00389
(0.162)
µ2007 : Q1
0.311***
(0.0995)
µ2007 : Q2
-0.0524
(0.149)
µ2007 : Q3
-0.162
(0.113)
µ2007 : Q4
-0.143
(0.112)
CBSA Time-varying Controls
X
State-Quarter FE
X
CBSA FE
X
CBSA-Quarter Observations
6,160
Number of CBSA
220
R-squared
0.656
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: This table reports coefficients estimates of the event study specified in equation 2.9.
These estimates quantify the difference in housing price growth between CBSAs with different
financial ties to disaster areas. CBSAs located in the states hit by the hurricane or their adjacent
states are dropped from the sample. Multi-States CBSAs are not considered. The sample at hand
contains 220 CBSAs in 36 states. The omitted category is 2004:Q4 (one year prior to the hurricane).
Housing prices growth had insignificant differences for an extended period of time before Katrina
indicating parallel trends prior to the storm. Significant difference in HPI growth appears exactly
after the storm in 2005:Q4. This one-off shock to HPI growth resulted in a persistent gap in price
levels as shown in figure 2.1. The average state in the sample contains 6.1 CBSAs. CBSAs’ timevarying Controls include lagged version of employment, unemployment and HPI. Standard errors
are clustered at the CBSA level.
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Table 2.11: CBSAs’ Financial Linkages to Katrina-impacted areas
and Housing and Labor markets characteristics of CBSAs in two categories based on
the strength of their financial linkages to disaster areas

Panel A
Mean
0.0246

CBSAs financial linkages

Median
0.0243

St. Dev.
.00758

Panel B

Below Median linkages

Above Median linkages

Mean

Median

St. Dev.

Mean

Median

St. Dev.

HPI Quarterly Growth (%)

0.995

0.956

1.931

0.968

1.011

2.703

Unemployment Rate (%)

5.461

5.2

1.849

6.081

5.45

2.631

160.335

90.317

201.243

241.307

104.600

333.276

Labor Force (1000)

Note: Panel A reports summary statistics of the measure of CBSA’s financial linkages to disaster areas as computed by equation 2.3. Panel B reports summary statistics of housing and labor
markets characteristics of CBSAs in two categories stratified based on the strength of their financial linkages to disaster areas. CBSAs located in the states hit by the hurricane and their adjacent
states are dropped from the sample. Multi-States CBSAs are not considered. The sample at hand
contains 220 CBSAs in 36 states. Source: HMDA, FHFA and Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Local Area
Unemployment Statistics (LAUS).
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Table 2.12: Summary Statistics of Labor and Housing Markets Characteristics of
different local markets (counties) in two categories based on the strength of their
financial linkages to disaster areas

Sample Stratified by
counties’ financial linkages
to Katrina areas:
Below Median linkages

Labor Markets
Population (1000)
Labor Force (1000)
Unemployment Rate (%)
Per capita income ($1000)
Housing Markets
Yearly HPI Growth (%)
Housing Supply Elasticity
Housing Stock (units)
Yearly Housing Stock Growth (%)
Yearly Addition to the stock (units)
Mortgage Markets
Market Share of National Banks
Market Share FRS Banks
Market Share of FDIC Banks
Market Share of HUD-regulated institutions
County-Year Observations

Above Median linkages

Mean

St. Dev.

Mean

St. Dev.

220.262
114.422
5.002
31.411

423.16
212.237
1.392
8.134

201.651
101.877
5.38
28.546

608.186
300.397
1.594
7.710

4.8
0.14
90051.94
1.6
1047.383

3.5
0.327
170393.6
1.4
1517.637

4.7
4.1
0.13
0.446
81466.71 218372.9
1.6
1.3
1187.394 3077.562

0.33
0.14
0.13
0.21

0.11
.08
0.11
0.09

0.32
0.16
0.12
0.24

0.10
.08
0.09
0.08

2966

Note: This table reports summary statistics of different characteristics of labor, housing and
mortgage markets for two sets of counties based on the strength of their financial linkages to
Katrina-hit areas: the below median linked areas and the above median ones. Characteristics are
averaged over the five years preceding the hurricane 2000:2004. The sample includes all urban
counties outside of Katrina-hit areas and their adjacent states. Housing supply elasticity measures
are computed as the inverse of the land unavailability measure provided by Lutz & Sand (2017).
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Table 2.13: The Impact of Financial linkages to disaster areas on Housing Prices in a
County-level Analysis and the Stabilizing Role of Small Scale Community Banks

I[T ime > 2005] ×Link

(1)
HPI Growth

(2)
HPI Growth

(3)
HPI Growth

-0.369**
(0.171)

-0.489**
(0.196)

-0.408**
(0.177)
0.372
(0.250)
-0.0105
(0.00645)

I[T ime > 2005] ×Link × HSE
I[T ime > 2005] ×HSE
I[T ime > 2005] ×Link × Share local banks

County-Year Controls
X
CBSA-Year Fixed Effects
X
County Fixed Effects
X
County-Year Observations
6,783
Number of Counties
764
Number of CBSAs
206
R-squared
0.922
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

1.034***
(0.392)
X
X
X
6,733
758
203
0.924

X
X
X
6,765
764
206
0.922

Note: This table reports coefficients’ estimates from difference-in-difference specifications 2.10,
2.12 and 2.13. The outcome variable is the yearly growth of the county-level house price index.
The explanatory variables is the interaction of financial linkages to Katrina areas Link and an
indicator function that equals one in the post-hurricane period and zero otherwise. Column (2)
adds an additional interaction with the share of local banks in each county computed in the year
before the storm 2004. Column (3) reports the estimates of a triple difference using a third layer of
heterogeneity in housing supply elasticity HSE. The panel covers the period 2001:2009. Counties
located in the states hit by the hurricane and their adjacent states are dropped from the sample
(Counties located in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee &
Texas are dropped). County-year level controls include lagged versions of the logarithm of the
labor force, per capita income, population, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of local mortgage market
concentration, HPI and the unemployment rate. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
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Table 2.14: Triple Difference Analysis using Housing Supply Elasticity:
Housing Quantities Response (Units, Buildings and Monetary Valuation of
Construction Work)

I[T ime > 2005] ×Link
I[T ime > 2005] ×Link × HSE
I[T ime > 2005] ×HSE

County-Year Controls
CBSA-Year Fixed Effects
County-Year Observations
Number of Counties
Number of CBSAs
R-squared

(1)
∆ Housing U nits

(2)
∆ Buildings

(3)
∆ V aluation ($M M )

2,093
(2,427)
-14,239*
(8,406)
394.7*
(237.4)

386.0
(1,628)
-9,195*
(4,930)
251.4*
(137.8)

330.9
(387.2)
-2,358*
(1,324)
66.99*
(37.30)

X
X
X
X
6,641
6,641
751
751
203
203
0.505
0.639
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

X
X
6,641
755
204
0.580

Note: This table reports coefficients’ estimates from difference-in-difference-in-difference
specification 2.17. Link is the measure of financial linkages to Katrina areas. HSE refers to the
housing supply elasticity measure computed as the inverse of the land unavailability measure
of Lutz & Sand (2017). The dependent variables are first differences of annual new residential
construction in terms of housing units (Column (1)), buildings (Column (2)) and the monetary
valuation of the construction (in $ Million) in Column (3). Counties located in the states hit by the
hurricane and their adjacent states are dropped from the sample (Counties located in Alabama,
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee & Texas are dropped). The panel
covers the period 2001:2009. Negative estimates reported in row (2) suggest a negative housing
quantity response for elastic local housing markets. Insignificant results reported in row (1) point
to insignificant quantity response for inelastic markets. County-year level controls include lagged
versions of the logarithm of the labor force, per capita income, population, Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index of local mortgage market concentration, HPI and the unemployment rate. Standard errors
are clustered at the county level.
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Figure 2.1: Evolution of Housing Prices in Local Markets with strong financial ties to
disaster areas compared to the ones with weak financial ties. Trends Divergence
occurred exactly after Katrina.

Note: The figure illustrates pre and post trends of Housing Price Indices of the least financially
connected quartile of CBSAs (red line) versus the most financially connected quartile of CBSA
(blue line) to Katrina-impacted areas holding state constant. Housing prices in the local markets
with strong financial ties to Katrina-hit areas witnessed a one-off shock exactly after the storm,
which translated to a persistent gap in price levels, relative to the markets with weak financial ties
to Katrina areas. The vertical line indicates the exact timing of Katrina (2005:Q3). Trends were
parallel prior to the storm and diverged exactly after the storm in 2005:Q4. This sample contains
220 CBSAs in 36 states. CBSAs located in the states hit by the hurricane or their adjacent states
are dropped from the sample (CBSAs located in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Tennessee & Texas are dropped from the sample).
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Figure 2.2: Financial Inter-linkages to Katrina-hit Regions

Note: The figure shows a heat map of financial linkages of all urban counties (located within
a Core-Based Statistical Area) in the mainland United States, outside of disaster areas and their
adjacent states. Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee and Texas
are dropped from the sample. Darker red counties have stronger financial linkages to Katrina-hit
areas.
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Figure 2.3: Abnormal Housing Market Activity in Disaster-Affected Regions in the
post-Katrina period supporting the hypothesis of a positive shock to aggregate
demand in disaster areas: Prices & Quantities
Post-Katrina Surge in Building Permits
Issuance

Post-Katrina Surge in Housing Stock
Growth

Faster Home Value Appreciation after the
storm

Note: This figure plots the coefficients’ estimates of specification 2.5. The dashed vertical line
indicates the year of the hurricane. The three sub-figures document abnormal housing market
and construction activities in Katrina-damaged counties compared to the neighboring undamaged
counties. This includes abnormal issuance of building permits (top-left figure), abnormal growth
of the housing stock (top-right figure) and abnormal housing prices growth (bottom figure) in
the post-Katrina period. The estimates point to a negligible and constant difference between the
damaged and undamaged counties in the pre-Katrina period. Coefficients are estimated relative
to an omitted category (2004) normalized to be zero. Standard errors are clustered at the county
level.
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Figure 2.4: Abnormal Mortgage Market Activity in Disaster-Affected Regions in the
post-Katrina period supporting the hypothesis of a positive shock to aggregate
demand in disaster areas
Post-Katrina Surge in the Growth of Mortgage Credit Volumes in disaster areas

Post-Katrina Surge in Loan Approval Rates in disaster areas

Note: This figure plots the coefficients’ estimates of specification 2.5. The dashed vertical
line indicates the year of Katrina. The two sub-figures document the abnormal activity in the
mortgage market in the aftermath of the storm including, a sharp increase in the average loan
approval rates (left figure) at the county-year level and abnormal growth of credit origination
volumes (right figure) in Katrina-damaged counties compared to undamaged counties relative to
an omitted category in 2004. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
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Figure 2.5: Post-Katrina Surge in Banks’ Entry and Lending in disaster markets

Post-Katrina Surge in Banks’ Market Entry in disaster areas

Post-Katrina Surge in Banks’ Lending in disaster areas

Note: The upper figure plots the coefficients’ estimates of specification 2.6. The dashed vertical line indicates the year of the hurricane. Each coefficient µτ quantifies, at each point of time,
the average difference in the likelihood of bank entry to a local market in Louisiana or Mississippi, compared to the likelihood of entry to local markets in the rest of the country, relative to
an omitted category µ2004 normalized to be zero. The lower graph plots the average percentage
change in a bank lending volumes in disaster areas relative to non-disaster areas at each point of
time. The pattern on the estimated coefficients indicates an increased likelihood of banks’ market
entry and lending in Katrina-hit markets compared to other local markets in the U.S. starting 2005,
consistent with a significant flow of capital towards disaster areas in the post-Katrina period. All
banks’ characteristics are held constant. All banks considered are headquartered outside of the
U.S. South. Standard errors are clustered at the CBSA level.
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Figure 2.6: Abrupt decline in Loan Approval Rates in the Undamaged Regions as a
function of Bank’s historic market Presence (Geographic Footprint) in
Katrina-affected regions

Note: This figure plots the coefficients’ estimates using equation 2.7. The dashed vertical line
indicates the year of the hurricane. The figure shows that banks with historic market presence in
Katrina areas significantly reduced their loan approval rates in the distant undamaged areas (outside of Katrina-affected areas and their four adjacent states including Alabama, Arkansas, Florida,
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee and Texas), immediately after the storm. Trends are exactly superimposed for an extended period of time prior to Katrina. Local demand factors are held
constant. Bank-Year level control variables include lagged versions of: Total Assets, Interest Expenses to Assets, Non Performing Loans to Assets, Equity ratio, Provisions for loan loss, Unused
Commitments and lending in Katrina areas. The average treatment effect estimated in Table 2.4
points to a 1.24 percentage points decline in bank’s loan approval rate, in the post period relative
to prior to the storm, for the bank with the average historic geographic footprint in Katrina areas.
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level.
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Figure 2.7: Parallel pre-Katrina Trends and Post-Katrina Divergence between the
Linked and the less Linked Counties
Changes in HPI (First Difference) in Local Markets (Counties) with strong linkages to
disaster areas Vs. Local Markets with weak linkages to disaster areas

HPI in Local Markets (Counties) with strong linkages to disaster areas Vs. Local
Markets with weak linkages to disaster areas

Note: The upper figure plots the coefficients’ estimates of specification 2.11. The dashed vertical
line indicates the year of Katrina. The dependent variable is the First Difference of House Price
Index at the county-year level. The lower figure plots coefficients’ estimates of the same model
with HPI as the outcome variable, accounting for counties’ fixed effects. The variation exploited is
the variation in financial linkages to Katrina-hit areas of different counties within the same CBSA.
Counties located in the Katrina-hit states and their adjacent states (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida,
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee & Texas) are dropped from the sample. Trends are
superimposed prior to Katrina. Local markets with strong financial linkages to Katrina-hit areas
witnessed a significant decline in housing prices immediately after Katrina. Standard errors are
clustered at the county level.
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Appendix A
Supplemental Material to Chapter 1
I
I.1

Data and Variables Definitions:
Data Structure
The data used are from the 1996 and 2001 panels of the Survey of Income and Program

Participation (SIPP). SIPP includes core waves and topical modules. Core waves are used to collect
information on workers’ labor market histories, earnings and Social Security (SS) income receipt.
The 1996 panel provides 12 core waves of data spanning the period 1996-1999 while the 2001 panel
provides 9 waves spanning the period 2001-2003. Topical modules are the source of information
on workers’ asset holdings including assets held in retirement accounts, 401(k)s and IRAs. Asset
data are collected on a yearly basis along with waves 3,6,9 and 12 (where available). Accordingly,
the 1996 SIPP panel tracks asset data for four consecutive years while the 2001 panel tracks asset
data for three years. Using both core and topical modules, I link workers’ labor market histories to
their pension outcomes based on the following timing of data collection. Each set of consecutive
three cores of SIPP (waves 1-3, 4-6, 7-9 and 10-12) cover approximately a calendar year. Asset data
are collected approximately at the end of the calendar year or at the beginning of the following
year depending on the rotation schedule determining the date of the interview.
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I.2

Tax-Deferred Asset Data
Similar to Gelber (2011), I use the 401(k) asset data labeled taltb and provided in the annual

topical modules in response to the following survey question: As of the last day of the reference
period, what was the total balance or market value (including interest earned) of any 401K or thrift plans
held in ...’s own name? The IRA asset information is retrieved from workers’ responses to the survey
question: As of the last day of the reference period, what was the total balance or market value (including
interest earned) of the IRA accounts in ...’s OWN name?

I.3

Labor Market History Data
These end-of-year pension asset outcomes are then linked to workers’ labor market histo-

ries during the year. Similar to Chetty (2008), I use weekly employment status provided by the
survey variable RWKESR to construct a worker-year-level layoff indicator that is equal to one if a
worker experienced some weeks of unemployment during the year (where a calendar year spans
three consecutive waves: waves 1-3, 4-6, 7-9 and 10-12 respectively). Weekly employment status can take any of the following values: (1) With job/business - working, (2) With job/business
- not on layoff, absent w/out pay, (3) With job/business - on layoff, absent w/out pay, (4) No
job/business - looking for work or on layoff and (5) No job/business - not looking and not on
layoff. I code weekly Layoff status to be equal to one for responses of (3) or (4) and zero otherwise.
I then compute the number of layoff weeks during a given year and set the variable Layoff to be
equal to one if the worker had some weeks of layoff during a given year and zero otherwise. I
also identify the timing of a to be a change in the Layoff variable from 0 to one (conditional on
the person not being out of the labor force). Accordingly, the job separation due to a layoff variable
identifies the exact point of time (Age-Year) at which the layoff event took place. I use this variable
to identify eligibility for 401(k) penalty-free withdrawals. On the other hand, the Layoff variable
is used to identify workers’ eligibility for unemployment insurance.
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I.4

The “Not in the labor force” population
I use the same weekly employment status variable RWKESR to determine whether an in-

dividual is on the labor force. For that purpose, I count the number of weeks during which an
individual reported his / her employment status to be No job/bus - not looking and not on layoff.
Accordingly, I consider an individual to be retired if he / she report being unemployed and not
looking for a job during all weeks of the years.

I.5

Social Security Income Receipt Data
Social Security income receipt is provided by the two variables T01AMTA and ER01A that

provide information on monthly Social Security income receipt. To identify the exact Age-Month
point at which individuals started collecting their benefits, I identify the transition timing from no
Social Security income to some Social Security income receipt. I then truncate this exact age to the
smallest age integer to graph Appendix Figure AI. Similarly, for the empirical analysis conducted
in section 7 of the paper, I use the transition from no social security income at year t to some
social security income reported in the following year t+1 as an indicator of social security benefits
initiation. I remove few observations corresponding to workers who report disability as a reason
for claiming.

II

Optimal Social Security Claiming Strategy:
Initiating social security benefits entails a trade-off between the benefit amount and the

duration of benefit receipt. Claiming at the Full Retirement Age (FRA), 65 for the cohorts studied
in this paper, guarantees a monthly social security income equal to the worker’ Primary Insurance
Amount (PIA), computed based on the worker’s earning history. Early claiming, relative to the
FRA, enables individuals to receive benefits for a longer duration. However, early claiming is
penalized by an actuarial adjustment of 59 % per month (or 6.67% per year of delay) for each month
of difference between the FRA and the age of social security benefits initiation. On the other hand,
delaying claiming beyond the FRA is rewarded by a Delayed Retirement Credit of
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11
24 %

per month

of delay (or 5.5% per year of delay for cohorts born 1933-1935). There is no gain from delaying
beyond age 70.
Accordingly, gains from delaying benefits claiming depends on survival expectations, patience (discount rate) and the worker’s PIA. A healthier individual has an incentive to delay claiming since his / her stream of social security benefits is expected to last longer. A low discount rate
creates an incentive for workers to delay claiming since future benefits become more valued. Similar to Coile et al. 2002, I study the case of a 62 years old worker considering the option of claiming
at 62, 63, 64, 65, etc ...1 The Expected Present Discounted Value (EPDV) of his/her stream of social
security benefits can be computed as follows:

EP DV (Claiming Age) =

M axAge−62
X

β (A−62) × SS(A | Claiming Age) × P (A | 62)

A=62

M ax Age is the maximum potential longevity, 119 years in this case. β is the discount rate.
SS(A | Claiming Age) is the total annual amount of social security benefits the worker is entitled
to at age A conditional on claiming at Claiming Age. The stream of annual total Social Security
entitlements, starting age 62 onwards, can be expressed as a vector conditional on the claiming
age as follows:



I[Claiming
Age
=
62]


0.8 P IA
0.8 P IA
0.8 P IA
0.8 P IA ... 

0.8 P IA 0.8 P IA
 

I[Claiming Age = 63]


 


0.867 P IA 0.867 P IA 0.867 P IA 0.867 P IA 0.867 P IA ... 
 0

  I[Claiming Age = 64 

 


 0
0
0.934 P IA 0.934 P IA 0.934 P IA 0.934 P IA ...


 
I[Claiming Age = 65 

 



×
SS(A | Claiming Age) = 12 ×

0
0
P IA
P IA
P IA
... 
 0

 I[Claiming Age = 66]



 

 0
0
0
0
1.055P IA 1.055P IA ... 

  I[Claiming Age = 67 


 

 0

0
0
0
0
1.1P IA ...
 



 I[Claiming Age = 68]



...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...


where I[Claiming Age = n] is an indicator function that equals one at the worker’s chosen
claiming age (62 or 63 or 64 etc ...) and zero otherwise. P (A | 62) is the probability of survival till
age A (By definition, the worker is assumed to be alive at age 62) and is given by:

P (A | 62) =

QA

i=62 P (i

+ 1 | i)

1. For simplicity, I consider claiming strategies that involve claiming on birthdays.
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Where P (i + 1 | i) is the gender and cohort-specific conditional probability of survival
till age i+1 conditional on being alive at age i obtained from the social security life tables for the
1930’s cohort. Accordingly, the EPDV can be expressed as multiples of PIA for a given discount
rate and assuming average survival expectations. Similar to Coile et al. (2002) and Shoven and
Slavov (2014), I use an interest rate of 3% to compute the EPDV (in multiples of PIA) of a single
worker conditional on claiming at different birthdays starting 62.

Expected Present Discounted Value
of the Social Security Benefit Stream
conditional on claiming at different ages (multiples of PIAs)

Male

Female

Claiming at Age

r=3%

r=3%

62
63
64
65

131.66
132.28
131.81
130.23

151.21
153.47
154.55
154.39

Accordingly, for a single worker claiming on his /her earnings record, optimal claiming
strategies are 63 and 64 for men and women respectively. The EPDV gains from an optimal delay
are 0.62 and 3.34 PIAs (relative to claiming at the earliest age of eligibility 62) for men and women
respectively.
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Appendix Tables and Figures

Table A.1: Retirement Accounts and financial asset holdings of the working age
population (22-65) years old

Retirement Accounts (Own Name)
Asset Type ($)

Mean Median Std. dev.

IRAs
401(k)

4,975.8
7,975.7

0
0

Asset Type ($)
Checking Accounts
Interest Earning Accounts
Bonds
Stocks and Funds
Credit Card and Store Bills

Obs.

No. Workers Account Ownership Rate

22,941.5 287,623
28,831.6 287,623

104,031
104,031

19.3%
28.2%

in Own Name

Jointly with spouse

Mean Median Std. dev.

Mean Median Std. dev.

137.5
1978.4
578.9
6,428.4
890.2

121.5
2,497.5
456.2
8,419.7
913.7

0
0
0
0
0

598.6
9,956.3
15,577.3
314,450
19,295

0
0
0
0
0

448.8
9,531
7762.2
462,085.2
14,982.6

Note: This table provides summary statistics of assets held in tax-deferred retirement accounts
(reported in own name), other liquid taxable savings and credit cards and store bills debt (reported
in own name and jointly with spouse) for the working-age, 22-65 years old, population. The
sample contains 287,623 worker-year observations. Asset values are reported in 2000’s dollars.
Values are obtained from the SIPP asset topical modules accompanying waves 3,6,9 and 12 (where
available).
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Figure A.1: Social Security Claiming Patterns (Men and Women)

Note: The two figures plots the Social Security claiming trends produced using SIPP data for
men (upper figure) and women (lower figure) separately. A large density of claiming events is
observed for individuals between their 62nd and 63rd birthday, followed by a smaller spike for
individuals between their 65th and 66th birthday. Women are less likely to wait until the Full
Retirement Age (65 for the cohorts in question). Source: Author’s calculation based on the SIPP
sample.
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Figure A.2: The likelihood of observing a job loss event at each age:
Density Analysis

Note: The figure plots the likelihood of observing a job loss event at each age estimated
using specification 3. Each estimate quantifies the likelihood of observing a job loss at
each age relative to the omitted category (age 54). No discontinuity is observed around
the age of the change in the tax price of 401(k) pensions, 55. This result alleviates the
concern about the possibility of policy-induced job separations at the age cutoff 55.
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Figure A.3: Average Growth Rates of IRA assets following a Job Loss at Different
Ages compared to employed workers

Note: The figure plots the average growth rates of assets held in Individual Retirement Accounts IRAs at each age net of person fixed effects, for the job losers and the employed. The
treatment group (red line) is the average IRA asset growth rates for the workers who experienced
a layoff at each age. The control group (blue line) consists of the average growth rates for the
population that didn’t experience a layoff at that age. The dashed vertical line indicates age 60
at which the tax-price of accessing IRA accounts changed from 10% to zero penalty. Immediately
after the removal of the penalty, job losers initiate large IRA asset withdrawals.
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Appendix B
Supplemental Material to Chapter 2
I

Credit Market Tightening in the Undamaged Regions
I provide additional corroborating evidence on a credit market tightening in the areas with

strong financial ties to disaster regions, starting immediately after the storm. This tightening coincided with the observed decline in home values. To implement this test, I collect average yearly
level data on conventional single family mortgage rates in eighteen large metropolitan areas made
available by the FHFA interest rate survey. Similar to the housing prices and construction’ analyses, I drop southern metropolitan areas to lessen potential confounding labor market factors
related to the hurricane.1 Using this data, I show that, immediately after the storm, interest rates
abruptly increased in the MSAs with strong financial linkages to Katrina-damaged regions relative
to the ones with weak linkages, indicating a credit tightening outside of Katrina-damaged regions.
To formally document this observation, I estimate the following event study specification:

IRM t = α + ηM + ζt +

X

1[τ = t] × LinkM × µτ + Xist Γ + M t

(I)

τ 6=2004

1. After having removed Southern metropolitan areas, the data provided by the FHFA interest rate survey include the following 18 MSAs: Chicago, Cleveland, Columbus, Denver, Detroit, Indianapolis, Kansas
City, Milwaukee, Minneapolis-St. Paul, New York, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Pittsburgh, Portland, St. Louis,
San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle.
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IRM t is the conventional single family mortgage rate at Metropolitan Area M at year t provided by the FHFA interest rate survey. ηM and ζt denote MSA and year fixed effects respectively.
Xist are time-varying MSA-level labor market controls. LinkM is the measure of financial linkages of MSA M to Katrina regions. 1[τ = t] are a set of indicator functions that equal one at their
corresponding year and zero otherwise. The coefficients µτ ’s quantify the average difference in
conventional mortgage rates each year between different metropolitan areas based on the strength
of their financial linkages to disaster areas, relative to an omitted category µ2004 normalized to be
zero.
Figure B.5 plots the set of coefficients µτ ’s. For an extended period of time prior to 2005,
financial linkages to disaster areas didn’t imply significant differences in mortgage rates between
local markets. Starting 2005, the year of Katrina, the estimated µτ ’s suggest a positive shift in
interest rates between different metropolitan areas based on the strength of their financial linkages
to disaster areas LinkM . Table B1 documents an average interest rate differential of 0.36 percentage
points in the post storm period compared to before Katrina. Together, results about banks’ credit
re-allocation away from the undamaged areas and the interest rate differential point to a credit
market tightening in the physically undamaged local markets located far away from the areas hit
by hurricane Katrina. These findings support the hypothesis of a credit-induced decline in home
values in the undamaged regions after the storm.

II

Variables Definitions for the Bank-Level Analysis:
Mortgage Loan Approval Rates are computed, using HMDA loan level data, following An-

toniades (2016) and using the applications that ultimately led to an approval or a denial decision.
This includes three types of applications: 1) Approved applications that led to loan originations,
2) Approved Applications that were but not accepted (by the applicants) and 3) loan applications
that were denied by financial institutions. Accordingly, applications withdrawn by the applicant, files closed for incompleteness, loans purchased by the institution (already originated by a
financial institution) are not considered for the computation of loan approval rates. Similar to
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Antoniades (2016), I consider (1) and (2) as approvals as they both signal the willingness of the
financial institution to extend credit to the applicant. Hence, I compute the Bank-CBSA-Year loan
approval rate as the ratio of the sum of loan entries reporting (1) and (2) as outcomes to the sum
of loans reporting (1), (2) and (3) as outcomes.
Regarding banks’ balance sheet variables, they are constructed from the end-of-year Quarterly Report of Condition and Income (Call Report) maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago, as follows:
• Asset Size is reported as item RCFD2170.
• Core Deposits are computed the sum of Total transaction account (rcon2215) + Money market deposits accounts MMDA’s (rcon6810) + Other non-transaction savings deposits (rcon0352)
+ Total time deposits of less than 100, 000 (rcon6648) - Total brokered retail deposits issued
in denominations of less than 100, 000 (rcon2343).
• Total Unused Commitments are reported as item rcfd342.
• Loans secured by real estate are reported as item rcfd1410.
• Commercial and industrial loans are reported as item rcfd1766.
• Total interest expenses are reported as item riad4073.
• Total transaction accounts are reported as item rcon2215.
• Interest On deposits are reported riad4170.
• Non Performing Loans are computed as the sum of total loans and lease financing receivables: past due 90 days or more and still accruing (rcfd1407) and total loans and lease financing receivables: nonaccrual (rcfd1403).
• Total equity capital is reported as item rcfd3210.
• Liquidity is computed as securities held to maturity (rcfd1754), securities available for sale
(rcfd1773), federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreements to resell (rcfd1350),
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non-interest bearing balances and currency and coin (rcfd0081) and interest-bearing balances (rcfd0071).
• Provision for loan and lease losses are reported as (riad4230).
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Appendix Tables and Figures

Table B1: Post-Katrina Increase in Interest rates in the financially linked MSAs
relative to the weakly linked MSAs (Outside of disaster areas)

Mortgage Rates
I[T ime > 2005] ×LinkM

0.361*
(0.194)

MSA controls
X
Year FE
X
MSA FE
X
MSA-Year Observations
162
Number of MSAs
18
R-squared
0.970
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The estimate presented at this table quantifies the average Contract interest rate differential between metropolitan areas based on the strength of their financial linkages to Katrina
areas, after the storm compared to before the storm. The period of study is 2001:2009. The dependent variable is the contract interest rate for single family conventional mortgages at MSA M at
year t. The estimate points to an average 0.36 percentage points increase in interest rates in the
areas with strong financial ties to Katrina areas in the post-Katrina period compared to the areas
with weak linkages to disaster areas, consistent with a credit tightening after the storm. Eighteen
MSAs are included in this test and are all outside of disaster areas and include: Chicago, Cleveland, Columbus, Denver, Detroit, Indianapolis, Kansas City, Milwaukee, Minneapolis-St. Paul,
New York, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Pittsburgh, Portland, St. Louis, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle. MSA controls include lagged versions of the size of the labor force and unemployment rates.
Standard Errors are clustered at the MSA level.
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Figure B.1: FEMA Katrina-related Disaster Declarations

Note: The figure shows the areas that were declared disaster areas, in relation to hurricane
Katrina, by FEMA’s disaster declarations DR 1602 for Florida declared in 8/28/2005, DR 1603 for
Louisiana declared in 8/29/2005, DR 1604 for Mississippi declared in 8/29/2005 and DR 1605
for Alabama in 8/29/2005. These regions become eligible for individual and / or public federal
assistance. Source: Baen and Dermisi (2007) and FEMA’s Disaster Declarations Summary File.
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Figure B.2: Property Damage due to Katrina

Note: Property Damage reported by the Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Database for the
United States SHELDUS maintained by Arizona State University and disaggregated at the county
level. The total property damage in the areas considered amounts to $74.15 BN (2005 $).
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Figure B.3: Abnormal Mortgage Market Activity in Disaster-Affected Regions in the
post-Katrina period compared to the pre-storm period

Weak Mortgage Growth before Katrina
(2004)

Booming local mortgage markets after
Katrina (2006)

Note: This figure makes a simple comparison of mortgage growth rates of total mortgage origination volumes per county before and after the storm in disaster areas. Orange
areas reflect weak mortgage growth while the purple indicates high growth rates of mortgage origination volumes. Immediately after the storm, most disaster counties shifted
from orange to purple between 2004 and 2006 reflecting a mortgage boom in disaster
areas. The areas considered in this simple comparison are the areas that were labelled
by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as ‘Major Disaster Declaration’
areas in the aftermath of hurricane Katrina. Source: HMDA Data.
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Figure B.4: Post-Katrina Surge in Loan Retention in disaster markets

Note: This figure plots the average percentage change in banks’ lending volumes originated in disaster areas and retained on banks’ balance sheets relative to origination and
retention in non-disaster areas, at each point of time. The pattern on the estimated coefficients indicates increased amounts of lending originated and retained on banks’ balance
sheets in disaster areas after the storm. All banks’ characteristics are held constant. All
banks considered are headquartered outside of the U.S. South. Standard errors are clustered at the CBSA level.
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Figure B.5: Post-Katrina Increase in Interest rates in the financially linked MSAs
relative to the weakly linked MSAs (Outside of disaster areas)

Note: This figure plots the coefficients’ estimates µτ ’s of Appendix equation I. It plots the evolution of the interest rate differential between different Metropolitan Areas based on the strength
of their financial linkages to Katrina regions. The dashed vertical line indicates the year of Katrina.
Prior to the storm, no statistically significant difference in interest rates is observed. Starting 2005,
a positive interest differential emerged between the areas with strong financial linkages to disaster areas and the areas with weak linkages. Eighteen MSAs are included in this test and are all
outside of disaster areas and include: Chicago, Cleveland, Columbus, Denver, Detroit, Indianapolis, Kansas City, Milwaukee, Minneapolis-St.Paul, New York, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Pittsburgh,
Portland, St. Louis, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle. Standard errors are clustered at the MSA
level.
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IV

List of CBSA included in the CBSA-Level Analysis:

1. Akron, OH
2. Albany-Lebanon, OR
3. Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY
4. Albuquerque, NM
5. Altoona, PA
6. Ames, IA
7. Anchorage, AK
8. Ann Arbor, MI
9. Appleton, WI
10. Asheville, NC
11. Atlantic City-Hammonton, NJ
12. Bakersfield, CA
13. Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD
14. Battle Creek, MI
15. Bay City, MI
16. Beckley, WV
17. Bellingham, WA
18. Bend, OR
19. Billings, MT
20. Binghamton, NY
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21. Bismarck, ND
22. Blacksburg-Christiansburg, VA
23. Bloomington, IN
24. Bloomsburg-Berwick, PA
25. Boise City, ID
26. Boulder, CO
27. Bowling Green, KY
28. Bremerton-Silverdale-Port Orchard, WA
29. Buffalo-Cheektowaga, NY
30. Burlington, NC
31. Canton-Massillon, OH
32. Carbondale-Marion, IL
33. Carson City, NV
34. Casper, WY
35. Cedar Rapids, IA
36. Chambersburg-Waynesboro, PA
37. Champaign-Urbana, IL
38. Charleston, WV
39. Charleston-North Charleston, SC
40. Charlottesville, VA
41. Cheyenne, WY
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42. Chico, CA
43. Cleveland-Elyria, OH
44. Coeur d’Alene, ID
45. Colorado Springs, CO
46. Columbia, MO
47. Columbia, SC
48. Columbus, IN
49. Columbus, OH
50. Corvallis, OR
51. Danville, IL
52. Decatur, IL
53. Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO
54. Des Moines-West Des Moines, IA
55. Dover, DE
56. Dubuque, IA
57. Durham-Chapel Hill, NC
58. East Stroudsburg, PA
59. Eau Claire, WI
60. El Centro, CA
61. Elizabethtown-Fort Knox, KY
62. Elkhart-Goshen, IN
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63. Elmira, NY
64. Enid, OK
65. Erie, PA
66. Eugene-Springfield, OR
67. Fairbanks, AK
68. Farmington, NM
69. Fayetteville, NC
70. Flagstaff, AZ
71. Flint, MI
72. Florence, SC
73. Fond du Lac, WI
74. Fort Collins, CO
75. Fort Wayne, IN
76. Fresno, CA
77. Gettysburg, PA
78. Glens Falls, NY
79. Goldsboro, NC
80. Grand Island, NE
81. Grand Junction, CO
82. Grand Rapids-Kentwood, MI
83. Grants Pass, OR
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84. Great Falls, MT
85. Greeley, CO
86. Green Bay, WI
87. Greensboro-High Point, NC
88. Greenville, NC
89. Greenville-Anderson, SC
90. Hanford-Corcoran, CA
91. Harrisburg-Carlisle, PA
92. Harrisonburg, VA
93. Hickory-Lenoir-Morganton, NC
94. Hilton Head Island-Bluffton, SC
95. Idaho Falls, ID
96. Indianapolis-Carmel-Anderson, IN
97. Iowa City, IA
98. Ithaca, NY
99. Jackson, MI
100. Jacksonville, NC
101. Janesville-Beloit, WI
102. Jefferson City, MO
103. Johnstown, PA
104. Joplin, MO
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105. Kahului-Wailuku-Lahaina, HI
106. Kalamazoo-Portage, MI
107. Kankakee, IL
108. Kennewick-Richland, WA
109. Kingston, NY
110. Kokomo, IN
111. Lake Havasu City-Kingman, AZ
112. Lancaster, PA
113. Lansing-East Lansing, MI
114. Las Cruces, NM
115. Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV
116. Lawrence, KS
117. Lawton, OK
118. Lebanon, PA
119. Lexington-Fayette, KY
120. Lima, OH
121. Lincoln, NE
122. Longview, WA
123. Lynchburg, VA
124. Madera, CA
125. Madison, WI
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126. Manhattan, KS
127. Mankato, MN
128. Mansfield, OH
129. Medford, OR
130. Merced, CA
131. Michigan City-La Porte, IN
132. Midland, MI
133. Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI
134. Missoula, MT
135. Modesto, CA
136. Monroe, MI
137. Morgantown, WV
138. Mount Vernon-Anacortes, WA
139. Muncie, IN
140. Muskegon, MI
141. Napa, CA
142. New Bern, NC
143. Niles, MI
144. Ocean City, NJ
145. Ogden-Clearfield, UT
146. Oklahoma City, OK
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147. Olympia-Lacey-Tumwater, WA
148. Oshkosh-Neenah, WI
149. Owensboro, KY
150. Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA
151. Parkersburg-Vienna, WV
152. Peoria, IL
153. Phoenix-Mesa-Chandler, AZ
154. Pittsburgh, PA
155. Pocatello, ID
156. Provo-Orem, UT
157. Pueblo, CO
158. Racine, WI
159. Raleigh-Cary, NC
160. Rapid City, SD
161. Reading, PA
162. Redding, CA
163. Reno, NV
164. Richmond, VA
165. Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA
166. Roanoke, VA
167. Rochester, MN
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168. Rochester, NY
169. Rockford, IL
170. Rocky Mount, NC
171. Sacramento-Roseville-Folsom, CA
172. Saginaw, MI
173. St. Cloud, MN
174. St. George, UT
175. Salem, OR
176. Salinas, CA
177. Salt Lake City, UT
178. San Diego-Chula Vista-Carlsbad, CA
179. San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA
180. San Luis Obispo-Paso Robles, CA
181. Santa Cruz-Watsonville, CA
182. Santa Fe, NM
183. Santa Rosa-Petaluma, CA
184. Scranton–Wilkes-Barre, PA
185. Sheboygan, WI
186. Sierra Vista-Douglas, AZ
187. Sioux Falls, SD
188. Spartanburg, SC
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189. Spokane-Spokane Valley, WA
190. Springfield, IL
191. Springfield, MO
192. Springfield, OH
193. State College, PA
194. Staunton, VA
195. Stockton, CA
196. Sumter, SC
197. Syracuse, NY
198. Terre Haute, IN
199. Toledo, OH
200. Topeka, KS
201. Trenton-Princeton, NJ
202. Tucson, AZ
203. Tulsa, OK
204. Utica-Rome, NY
205. Vallejo, CA
206. Vineland-Bridgeton, NJ
207. Visalia, CA
208. Walla Walla, WA
209. Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA
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210. Watertown-Fort Drum, NY
211. Wausau-Weston, WI
212. Wenatchee, WA
213. Wichita, KS
214. Williamsport, PA
215. Wilmington, NC
216. Winston-Salem, NC
217. Yakima, WA
218. York-Hanover, PA
219. Yuba City, CA
220. Yuma, AZ
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